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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Inter-facility Patient Sharing and the Spread of Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
By
Sarah Cousins
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Ecology
University of California, Irvine, 2016
Professor Oladele Ogunseitan, Chair
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are a rapidly emerging group of multiple
drug-resistant organisms (MDROs), with a mortality rate reaching 50%, causing the CDC
to declare them to be the highest level antibiotic-resistant microorganism threat. Drug
resistance limits the available treatments for CRE to older, more toxic antibiotics and makes
infection control practices to stop the spread of CRE crucial. Because of its dependence on
human factors, the spread of MDROs was examined using a newly proposed social ecological
model of CRE epidemiology which considered how factors at three levels - the patient, the
hospital, and the nursing home - interact throughout inter-facility patient sharing to influence
individual patient carriage of MDROs.
The current research began necessary CRE surveillance by quantifying the current prevalence
of CRE and identifying targets for intervention in a region in which CRE is still emerging.
The results confirm the importance of containing CRE, which had a high mortality rate
(31%) and extensive spread (52 days of healthcare facility exposure per year of follow up
for CRE carriers). The results also suggest targets for intervention at the intra-personal
level, including high comorbidity; and at the institutional levels, highlighting nursing home
facilities. The results of statewide studies show that Southern California UC hospitals having
10 times the rate of CRE carriage than Northern California hospitals. Statewide results
ix
reaffirmed the high mortality rate and extensive healthcare facility exposure of CRE carriers,
which were significantly greater than those of non-CRE carriers. They also emphasized the
importance of surveillance definitions in the control of infectious disease and demonstrated
how the intra-personal factor of the co-colonization among CRE carriers affects the potential
impacts of institutional level contact precautions policies in preventing the spread of emerging
MDROs.
Understanding the interplay of factors at the intrapersonal and institutional levels that
amplify MDRO spread is important to effectively target interventions, such as contact pre-
cautions, to reduce the burden of emerging MDROs. As the population in the United States
ages, it will be increasingly important to understand how infection prevention policies at
nursing home facilities and healthcare facility exposure contribute to the population burden
of infectious disease.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Burden of Healthcare-Associated Infectious
Diseases
The Institute of Medicine has called loss of life in the United States from serious adverse
medical events, including healthcare associated infections (HAI), akin to a Boeing 747-8
Aircraft with approximately 400 passengers crashing every two days with no survivors (1).
Among hospital inpatients, HAI affect an estimated 648,000 patients each year in the United
States (2). However, despite the fact that HAI have aﬄicted patients throughout the history
of healthcare and are now widely recognized as a as an important preventable cause of
morbidity and mortality, systematic study of HAI began only in the 1960s and the goal of
eliminating HAI remains elusive today.
In the 1960s, hospital infection control programs with a public health approach were insti-
tuted at a few large academic hospitals (3), ushering the first large scale HAI surveillance
efforts. Understanding the causes and transmission patterns of HAI is crucial to being able
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to stop their spread. Therefore, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
launched the first large study of HAI in 1965, when the Comprehensive Hospital Infections
Project (CHIP) was piloted. CHIP examined 6 community hospitals, testing methods for
surveillance and infection control, and found a mean HAI rate of 1.4% (3; 4). These initial
programs were designed with the goal of identifying HAI, establishing the baseline of en-
demic HAI, identifying nosocomial outbreaks, and promoting infection prevention measures
(4).
The full cost of HAI morbidity and mortality in the United States was not revealed until
1976 when a large national study by the CDC estimated that there were 2.1 million such
infections per year in 37.7 million hospital admissions in the 1970s (5). The CDCs Study
on the Effectiveness of Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC) project was the first attempt
to quantify the impact of HAI in a statistically representative sample of U.S. hospitals
(5). The study was undertaken in three phases between 1975 and 1976 (5). In the third
phase, CDC staff performed retrospective reviews of 500 patients medical charts before the
implementation of infection surveillance and control programs to establish baseline HAI
rates and 500 charts after implementation at 338 hospitals to determine the impact of these
practices (6). The overall rate of HAI was estimated to be 7.18 infections / 1000 patient
days or 5.7 infections per 100 admissions in U.S. acute care hospitals, and 30% were believed
to be preventable by appropriate infection control measures (5). Following these results,
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (now The Joint Commission) began
requiring infection surveillance for hospital accreditation in the United States in 1976 (7; 8).
More than thirty years later, HAI remains a major problem in the United States. A study
based on infections reported to the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance system in
2002 estimated that there were 1.7 million HAI in the United States in 2002 and that 98,987
deaths were caused by or associated with these HAI (9). The next year, in 2003, HAI killed
around 40 times as many people as SARS (10). The most recent report of surveillance
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data shows that, in 2009-2010, there were nearly 70,000 HAI reported by U.S. hospitals to
the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) (11). These NHSN data capture only a
small subset of the total HAI in the United States because not all hospitals report to the
NHSN, and those that do limit reporting to only a small subset of infection types. Todays
best estimate of the full burden of HAI in the United States comes from a point-prevalence
survey of 183 hospitals in 10 states which was conducted in 2011. That study estimated
721,800 HAI, more than ten times the number reported to NHSN, in 648,000 patients in
acute care hospitals in the United States in 2011 (2).
Of all HAI reported to the NHSN in 2009-2010, nearly 20% were associated with difficult-
to-treat pathogens resistant to multiple antibiotics, called multidrug-resistant organisms
(MDROs) (11). This included approximately 6,000 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus au-
reus (MRSA) HAI, 6,000 multi-drug resistant gram negative bacteria (MDR GNB) HAI, and
2,000 vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) HAI (11). Without improvements through-
out the healthcare system to decrease HAI, the aging population can be expected to have
increased healthcare facility exposure and HAI, including those caused by MDROs.
1.2 The Emergence of Antibiotic Resistance in Health-
care
Antibiotics were developed to treat infections, including HAI, by specifically killing or slowing
the growth of bacterial cells but not human cells. Penicillin, an early antibiotic which
was first used to treat civilians in the United States in 1942, was deemed a miracle drug
due to its ability to kill bacteria causing previously untreatable infections (12) and to save
soldiers with wound infections during World War II (13). Despite widespread optimism about
antibiotics, Alexander Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin, warned in 1945 that bacteria
3
could become resistant to penicillin, a phenomenon he had observed in his laboratory in
the 1920s, particularly if the drug was given in too low a dose or with the lack of adequate
supervision that might come from an oral route of administration (12). However, penicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus strains had already begun increasing rapidly in hospitals by 1944,
when some studies found more than 10% of strains to be resistant (14). By 1947, a report
was published of the proportion of penicillin-resistant Staphylococcus pyogenes in a London
hospital increasing from 14.1% to 38% in one year (14).
Resistant bacterial strains develop when antibiotics exert selective pressure, killing the vast
majority of bacteria infecting or colonizing the human host and leaving bacteria that survive
to reproduce rapidly without competition. Compared to humans, bacteria evolve extremely
rapidly due to their large population sizes, high mutation rates and short generation times
(15). Many molecular mechanisms of resistance have evolved including specific enzymes
which degrade antibiotics, pores and pumps which remove the antibiotic from the bacterial
cell before it can take effect, and structural changes to proteins targeted by antibiotics (16).
While mutations producing resistance can spread vertically between generations of bacte-
ria, resistance can spread even more quickly through horizontal transfer of resistance genes
directly from one bacterium to another, often through plasmids containing mobile genetic
elements (17). Genes conferring resistance to multiple antibiotics can travel together on
one plasmid. When a patient receives an antibiotic, selection for one resistance gene on the
plasmid also selects for the other resistance genes on the plasmid, compounding the problem
of antibiotic resistance.
As a result of these evolutionary processes, the trend, noticed first with penicillin, of the
emergence of resistant strains following shortly after the introduction of each new antibiotic
has continued. As examples, tetracycline was introduced in 1950 and tetracycline resistance
found in 1959, methicillin in 1960 and resistance in 1962, vancomycin in 1972 and resistance
in 1988, and ceftazidime in 1985 and resistance in 1987 (18). In 1952, it was observed that,
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only one month after the introduction of a new antibiotic into a hospital, health care workers
carried resistant strains and were transmitting them to patients (19). Antibiotic resistant
strains often appeared in hospitals where they were spread much like other HAI.
Between 1940 and 2004, 20.9% of newly emergent pathogen strains evolved through antibiotic
resistance (20). Among these were MRSA and extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing
bacteria (ESBL). Before 1968, only four cases of MRSA had been reported in the United
States, despite such strains making up 15% of staphylococcus isolates in some parts of
Europe. By 2008, 76% of a representative sample of S. aureus clinical isolates was found to be
MRSA (21). ESBLs were first identified in 1987 (22). Between 1986 and 1993, bloodstream
infections caused by Klebsiella pneumoniae went from 0% ESBL to 27% ESBL at one Chicago
hospital (22).
In addition to infections caused by bacteria with acquired resistance, another type of infection
has become more prominent as a result of selective pressures from antibiotic use. Clostridium
difficile was first identified in the 1930s (23). As early as the 1940s, guinea pigs treated with
penicillin for gas gangrene developed symptoms of what we would now recognize as C. difficile
infection (23). However, decades passed before the connection between antibiotic use and C.
difficile was made. It was not noted as the cause of antibiotic-associated pseudomembranous
colitis until 1978 (23). Current strains of C. difficile produce an order of magnitude more
toxin than older strains and have high resistance to fluoroquinolones (23).
1.3 The Burden of Antibiotic Resistance in Healthcare
Despite recent gains in controlling HAI, antibiotic resistance is increasing in their causative
bacterial populations, posing problems for future control. In a study of National Nosocomial
Infections Surveillance data from 1986 to 2003, the percentage of Escherichia coli and K.
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pneumoniae resistant to third-generation cephalosporins both rose significantly, as did Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa resistance to imipenem and ceftazidime and Acinetobacter resistance
to imipenem, ceftazidime, and amikacin (24). Between 2007-2008 and 2009-2010, the per-
cent of central line infections reported to the NHSN caused by E. coli resistant to extended
spectrum cephalosporins rose 54.3% and those caused by carbapenem resistant Acinetobac-
ter baumannii rose by 25.3% (11). Catheter-associated urinary tract infections caused by
fluoroquinolone resistant E. coli increased by 15.6% in the same time frame (11). Antibiotic
resistant strains have been shown to be no more common in critical care units, where they
were previously believed to be clustered, than hospitals at large (11), so HAI treatment
options are limited throughout acute care hospitals.
In addition to being more difficult to treat, antibiotic resistant bacteria also pose greater
risks to patients. Even asymptomatic carriage of these resistant pathogens is associated with
high risk of later infection (25; 26). Compared to bacteremia caused by methicillin-sensitive
strains (MSSA), MRSA bacteremia results nearly twice the risk of patient mortality (27).
Surgical site infections caused by MRSA are also more dangerous than those caused by
MSSA, resulting in more than three times higher risk of death within 90 days and a five
day longer hospital stay after infection (28). MRSA bacteremia similarly resulted in longer
hospital stays (29). A 2007 study of MRSA in 16.5 million people estimated that the number
of invasive MRSA infections in the United States in 2005 was 94,360, resulting in 18,650 in-
hospital deaths (30). MRSA surgical site infections also cost almost $14,000 more to treat
than those caused by MSSA in 2003 (28), while MRSA bacteremia cost almost $7,000 more
to treat in 2005 (29).
As the other leading cause of resistant HAI, antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacilli are
associated with increased mortality, length of stay, and costs in intensive care units (31).
An important source of antibiotic resistance in gram negative bacteria is the production
of extended spectrum beta-lactamases. Meta-analysis has found that bloodstream infec-
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tion caused by ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae is associated with a two-fold increase in
mortality compared to those caused by non-ESBL bacteria (32). These poor outcomes are
believed to be due to a 5-fold higher proportion of patients with ESBL not receiving effective
antibiotics in a timely manner than patients with non-ESBL, for whom a larger proportion
of antibiotics are likely to be effective (32). Patients with VRE HAI experience similar out-
comes. They have longer hospital stays, about twice as long for VRE versus VSE (33; 34),
and higher mortality (35; 33; 34; 36), with 2.5 times the risk of dying from VRE bacteremia
compared to VSE (37). Patients with VRE are also more likely to require surgery, ICU care,
or transfer to another hospital than patients with VSE (34). Hospitalizations for VRE have
been reported to cost, on average, 48%-64% more than those for VSE (33; 34).
In addition to harming hospitalized patients, multi-drug resistant strains of pathogens also
can spread within the community outside of hospitals. Community-associated strains of
MRSA were first observed in 1981, and by 2005, a MRSA study of 16.5 million people in the
United States found that the rate of community-acquired invasive MRSA infections was 4.6
per 100,000 (30).
1.4 Emergence of Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacte-
riaceae
1.4.1 Molecular Mechanisms of CRE Emergence
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) is another group of highly antibiotic-resistant
gram negative bacteria that cause serious infections. CRE is not a specific species of bacte-
ria but a group of bacteria which all share resistance to carbapenems. The most common
species of bacteria causing CRE HAI are E. coli, K. oxytoca, K. pneumoniae, and Enter-
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obacter spp. The CRE strains of these organisms evolved from susceptible strains due to
selective pressures from antibiotic use. To evade carbapenem treatment, CRE strains typ-
ically utilize one of two mechanisms: (1) coupling of overproduction of AmpC or extended
spectrum beta-lactamases with porin mutations or (2) production of carbapenemases (38).
The first mechanism, coupling of a specialized beta-lactamase with porin mutations, was
noted first in the United States. AmpC beta-lactamases are naturally occurring on the
chromosomes of Enterobacter, Citrobacter, Serratia, and Pseudomonas species; however,
more recently, they have been isolated from plasmids in other bacteria (39). The gene MIR-
1 was the first Amp-C-type beta lactamase isolated from a plasmid in a strain of one of these
other bacterial species, K. pneumoniae, which had caused HAI in eleven patients between
1988 and 1989 (40). Of known chromosomal genes causing naturally occurring resistance,
it most closely resembled the ampC gene of Enterobacter cloacae. Plasmids with genes of
this AmpC type convey resistance to expanded-spectrum cephalosporins, penicillins, and
monobactams but not normally to carbapenems; however, in combination with loss of outer
membrane proteins, the gene also conveys resistance to imipenem (39). The overproduced
beta-lactamase degrades the carbapenem while the porin loss decreases the outer membrane
permeability, slowing carbapenem penetration into the bacteria (41). This mechanism of
carbapenem resistance was first described in Enterobacter spp. in 1991 (41) and the first
Klebsiella isolates with the mechanism were cultured in 1994 (39). A similar mechanism
of imipenem resistance combining loss of a major outer membrane protein and the ESBL
gene SHV-2 was reported in 1997 (42). The second mechanism of carbapenem-resistance is
mediated by the production of carbapenemase enzymes, most commonly KPC and NDM.
The KPC-1 gene was first isolated from K. pneumoniae in 2001 and confers resistance to
imipenem, meropenem, extended-spectrum cephalosporins, and aztreonam (43). The NDM-
1 gene was first described in 2009 after being isolated from K. pneumoniae; infections caused
by bacteria containing this gene can only be treated with fluoroquinolones and colistin (44).
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A third carbapenem resistance gene, which is less common in the United states, is found in
the OXA-48 strain of CRE and was first identified in Turkey in 2001 (45).
As a result of these molecular mechanisms of resistance, very few antibiotics can be used to
treat CRE. The only potentially effective antibiotics are tigecycline (46), polymyxins, some
tetracyclines and aminoglycosides (47), and fosfomycin (48), and none of these treatments
are ideal. For example, it is difficult to achieve appropriate blood levels of tigecycline,
and it may be less effective in severely ill patients (49). Furthermore, in 2010 the FDA
issued a warning for tigecycline due to increased mortality relative to comparable drugs and
nausea/vomiting in 30% of patients (50). Polymyxins are the most effective in treating CRE
but are potentially dangerous due to known neuro- and nephro-toxicity (48; 50) and a lack
of standardized dosing (47). While aminoglycosides can be used in combination regimes to
treat CRE, they can result in nephrotoxicity, ototoxicity and neuromuscular blockade (50).
Fosfomycin is only available as an oral preparation in the U.S., therefore can be used only
for treatment of cystitis and no other CRE infections (50). These limited treatment options
mean that CRE infections pose substantial risk to patients. Furthermore, pan-resistant cases
of CRE have been reported which are resistant to all available antibiotics (51).
1.4.2 Outbreaks and Spread of CRE
In the U.S. the first case of KPC-producing CRE was reported from an isolate from a North
Carolina patient in 2001 (43). The first outbreak of CRE in a U.S. hospital occurred in New
York City between 2000 and 2001. During a one year period, 24 patients were infected across
4 ICUs which shared medical staff (52). Despite initial staff education sessions on correct
aseptic technique, isolation of patients with CRE in private rooms, and creation of a 24-hour
infection control on-call service, the outbreak continued (52). Only when it was observed
that urine culture had become the primary source of positive cultures and corrections were
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made to catheter bag emptying techniques was the outbreak resolved (52). By the end of
2001, K. pneumoniae resistant to carbapenems had been found in 7 New York City hospitals
and was believed to be spreading endemically (53).
In 2002-2003, 45% of K. pneumoniae in Brooklyn were resistant to extended-spectrum beta
lactamase inhibitors, leaving carbapenems as the antibiotic of choice for their treatment (54).
Among these, 3.3% were resistant to carbapenems (54). In October 2003, the gene causing
carbapenem resistance in K. pneumoniae was found in a different species, Enterobacter
cloacae, heightening concern about the spread of CRE (55). Subsequently, in 2003-4, two
additional outbreaks occurred in New York City, both in Brooklyn. Thirty-two patients
were found to have carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae in the first hospital and 27 in the
second (54). Of these cases, 73% were believed to be nosocomial in origin (54). Among the
19 patients with bacteremia examined, 47% died (54). By late 2004, 24% of K. pneumoniae
collected from Brooklyn hospitals was CRE (56).
In 2006, one hospital in Brooklyn implemented an intervention in the ICU to attempt to
better control CRE, which was spreading despite the use of contact precautions for CRE
carriers, daily environmental cleaning, infection control participation on weekday rounds, and
rectal surveillance for other MDROs upon admission to the unit and then weekly (57). The
intervention added to these infection control activities testing of the screening cultures for
CRE, placement of the CRE antibiogram in the medical record, extensive decontamination
of the ICU, cohorting patients with CRE to one end of the ICU, the addition of more, free-
standing alcohol hand sanitizer dispensers, and meetings on environmental cleaning between
infection control and nursing staff (57). Following this intervention, the rate of positive CRE
clinical culture decreased from 9.7 to 3.7 per 1,000 patient-days (57). However, despite these
gains, CRE prevalence continued to increase throughout the northeastern United States.
As it spread throughout the East Coast of the United States, CRE also began to be observed
in clinical cultures abroad in countries including Israel and Greece, and CRE surveillance
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was begun. As in the United States, KPC CRE was seen in Greece at least as early as 2001.
Between 2001 and 2006, the proportion of K. pneumoniae resistant to imipenem in hospitals
in the Greek System for the Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (GSSAR) had risen
from 1 to 20% and the fraction of hospitals with at least one CRE isolate was 62.5% by 2007
(58). During this time period, in 2002, Greece had the highest per capita consumption of
hospital specific antibiotics (those rarely used in ambulatory care, including third-generation
cephalosporins and carbapenems) in Europe (59).
In 2007, two cases of CRE were reported in Europe, both in patients who had been treated in
Greece (60; 61). As a result, a study was conducted to examine whether strains of K. pneu-
moniae with the KPC gene conveying resistance to carbapenems was present throughout the
country at hospitals participating in GSSAR (62). This study found that 77% of the 225 iso-
lates received from hospitals belonged to one hyper-epidemic clonal strain, which was also the
causative strain in the European patients whose illnesses triggered Greek CRE surveillance
(62). A case-control study in Greece found that among patients with carbapenem-sensitive
K. pneumoniae, use of fluoroquinolones and carbapenems were risk factors for developing
CRE (63).
In 2006, multiple hospitals in Israel began reporting outbreaks of CRE. One hospital saw
the percent of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae isolates increase from less than half a
percent in 2004 and 2005 to 3.1% of isolates in 2006 (64). Among those cases, 75% were
clones, signaling a possible outbreak (64). The strain of K. pneumoniae implicated in the
outbreak was later found to be closely related to strains collected during the NYC outbreak
(65). Country-wide CRE rates rose from 1.8 cases per 100,000 patient days to 11.8 in the first
half of 2006 and 27 by the second half (66). By early 2007, when the rate rose to 41.9 cases
per 100,000 patient days, it became apparent that the outbreak had spread country-wide
despite increased infection control efforts undertaken at local levels (66).
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In order to combat this outbreak, the Israel Ministry of Health implemented a country-wide
plan covering approximately 14,000 beds in acute care hospitals in March 2007 to attempt
to control CRE (66). This approach mandated public health reporting of positive CRE
cultures and isolation of CRE carriers (defined as those who had ever tested positive for
CRE), which included self-contained nursing units with dedicated nursing staff who did not
treat non-carrier patients. Beginning in May 2007, all hospitals submitted daily census
reports confirming isolation precautions and dedicated nursing for each patient with CRE,
and any deviations from guidelines were reviewed and responded to by the Ministry of Health.
This aggressive approach using regional coordination reduced CRE rates from a peak of 55.5
cases per 100,000 patient days in March 2007 to 11.7 in May 2008 (66). Compliance with the
control plan was nearly 100% for all components except dedicated nursing, for which each
10% increase in compliance was associated with a 0.6 case per 100,000 patient-days decrease
in CRE rates (66).
In May 2008, two new components were added to the infection prevention plan, intervention
in long term care facilities and active CRE surveillance in acute care hospitals (66). In
post-acute care hospitals (PACH, equivalent to a U.S. LTACH) the intervention consisted
of on-site assessments of facilities and scoring based on infection control measures, weekly
CRE census reports which were reviewed along with daily reports from acute care hospitals,
guidelines based on ward, including rectal screening upon patient entry to skilled nursing,
long term ventilation, and subacute wards (67). Prevalence surveys were conducted to track
progress and showed that CRE carriage rates decreased from 16.8% to 12.5% between 2008
and 2011 (67).
Meanwhile, in the United States, CRE spread across the country following the East to West
progression commonly seen in MDROs. The next major outbreak occurred in Illinois. In
May 2008, K. pneumoniae with CRE resistance caused by the same gene as that in the New
York City outbreaks was identified in a Chicago hospital laboratory and additional cases
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were subsequently identified throughout the region. Ultimately, the outbreak was traced
to a single long term care facility in which an intervention was begun in July 2008 (68).
The intervention included daily 2% chlorhexidine bathing for all patients, clarification of
cleaning duties belonging to different types of staff to ensure that all surfaces would be
cleaned, replacement of bedside curtains, testing of surveillance cultures for CRE, placement
of patients with hemodialysis, tracheostomy, or MDRO carriage on contact precautions, and
staff education (68). At the start of the intervention, point prevalence surveys showed that
21% of patients were CRE carriers, but after four months of the intervention, no patients
had positive CRE screening cultures (68).
In Chicago, the major CRE outbreak resulted from the spread of CRE in long-term acute-
care hospitals (LTACHs). LTACHs are defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services as certified acute care hospitals which focus on patients who, on average, stay more
than 25 days and who may have more than one serious condition, but who may improve
with time and care, and return home (69). A 2015 modeling study showed that despite high
prevalence of CRE in LTACHs in Chicago, when an intervention bundle including rectal
screening cultures for CRE carriage, daily chlorhexidine bathing, and cohorting, transmission
could be reduced sufficiently to prevent endemic spread (70). However, a study published
the same year reporting the outcomes of a similar intervention in LTACHs found that while
the bundle intervention resulted in significantly decreased rates of CRE acquisition, positive
CRE clinical culture, CRE bacteremia, and all-cause bacteremia, CRE acquisition did not
decline to zero (71). Instead, rates remained plateaued around 2 acquisitions of CRE per
100 patient-weeks (71).
Despite the relative success of these very aggressive interventions undertaken by individual
facilities during outbreaks, CRE has continued to spread throughout the United States. By
the end of 2010, KPC-producing CRE had been reported in 36 states, Washington, DC, and
Puerto Rico (38). In recognition of the wide spread of CRE in the United States and its
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epidemiologic importance, the CDC developed an interim surveillance definition for CRE
in 2012 (72). In the first six months of 2012, according to data from the National Health-
care Safety Network, 3.9% of short-stay acute care hospitals and 17.8% of LTACHs reported
HAI caused by CRE (73). CRE containment has proved similarly difficult abroad. De-
spite aggressive and resource-intensive measures coordinated at the national level, Israel has
not succeeded in eliminating CRE, with the initial dramatic reductions in CRE prevalence
eventually plateauing. Similar results were seen with the addition of PACHs to the Israeli in-
tervention program, which initially resulted in further declines in CRE prevalence but these
improvements also plateaued prior to elimination of CRE spread. In order to effectively
contain CRE, new approaches considering factors at all levels of CRE epidemiology may be
necessary.
1.5 The Burden of CRE
While CRE infections remain relatively rare in the United States, they pose a high burden
of risk to patients. The mortality associated with CRE infections is significantly higher than
infections caused by similar organisms which differ only in that they are susceptible to car-
bapenem antibiotics; for example when comparing imipenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
with imipenem-sensitive strains, patients with clinical cultures of resistant strains were five
times more likely to die than those with sensitive strains (74). In another study of hospi-
talized patients, patients who had a clinical microbiology culture positive for carbapenem-
resistant strain of K. pneumoniae had 3.9 times the odds of dying as those with a culture
for carbapenem-sensitive strains (75).
Compared to bloodstream infections caused by antibiotic-susceptible gram negative organ-
isms, those caused by CRE result in higher mortality (50). A case-control study conducted
at one Israeli hospital found that the crude mortality rate among patients with CRE blood-
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stream infections was 71.9% and attributable mortality rate was 50% (76). The all-cause
mortality in cases in which a patient has an invasive CRE infection is 50% (77).
CRE isolation, regardless of the presence of infection, has been associated with death in the
hospital in 29-52% of cases (50). Because of this high mortality, the dearth of medications
which can treat CRE, and the rapidity with which CRE spreads through health care facilities,
the CDC has designated the threat posed by CRE infections as urgent, the highest level of
antibiotic resistant microorganism threat (78). Understanding the spread of CRE is an
important step in implementing appropriate infection prevention protocols to mitigate this
threat.
1.6 A Social Ecological Model of MDRO Spread
While antibiotic resistance is clearly a product of antibiotic use, what McMichael calls a rare
instance of human action actually increasing biodiversity (79), prescribing patterns alone
cannot account for the rapid spread of MDROs. Transmission of MDROs between people,
rather than de novo evolution of resistance, is the primary factor driving the spread of antibi-
otic resistant organisms. After promoting the evolution of MDROs through antibiotic use,
humans disseminate MDROs as patients move from one hospital or nursing home to another,
spreading pathogens to other patients either directly or indirectly through healthcare work-
ers and fomites (80). This phenomenon of patient, and microbe, movement is referred to as
inter-facility patient sharing and plays a key role in the transmission of MDRO pathogens.
Because of its dependence on human activity, the spread of MDROs can be understood more
fully through the use of social ecological models, which consider multiple levels of influence
over the health of individuals.
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Public health has long taken a social ecological approach to understand multifactorial causes
of disease and disability in populations, and to develop effective, sustainable prevention
strategies. Beginning with the early 19th century French public health movement, the disci-
pline has emphasized the role of the environment in health, for example with the publication
of French epidemiologist Louis-Ren Villerms On Mortality in the Different Sections of Paris,
Demonstrating the Relation between Poverty and Disease in 1840. A re-analysis of Villerms
data in 2011 showed that indeed, taxes and rent, measures of poverty at that time, were cor-
related mortality while crowding was not (81). Villerm further addressed social epidemiology
by identifying prison type and detention conditions as key factors contributing to mortality
among prison inmates and by studying sanitation in working-class work places and commu-
nities (81). In the same period, Virchow, now more often known within medicine for his
contributions to pathology, conducted a study of typhus in Upper Silesia and concluded that
poor governance, poverty, and illiteracy were to blame, leading him to go on to found the
field of social medicine (82).
Despite this early social ecological orientation, medicine became increasingly individualistic
in its focus as scientific research provided support for contagionism, as early formulations
of the germ theory of disease were known, and political conservativism resisted the broader
reforms called for by social medicine. Virchows own obstinate resistance to germ theory and
disdain for the early work of Semmelweis, who demonstrated the importance of hand washing
in the spread of contagious disease, and Koch, whose postulates established a scientific
method for determining the causative organism in infectious diseases, further diminished the
standing of social medicine (82). With the rise of germ theory, the focus in public health
narrowed to emphasize the prevention of single-factor causes of infectious disease (83).
As science and politics evolved, the pendulum of popular opinion in public health swung
between an emphasis on individual behaviors and on collective environments. By the 1970s,
neoconservativism grew and, with it, an insistence on individualism and the free market as
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solutions to health policy in the United States (84). Public health policy took an increasingly
individualistic view of health, as exemplified by the Canadian 1974 Lalonde Report and 1979
U.S. Surgeon Generals Report, which placed strong emphasis on individual behaviors (85).
Education and persuasion to bring about individual life-style changes were emphasized as
public health interventions rather than collective action to change social settings or environ-
ment (86). Increasingly, voluntary risk-taking and lifestyle decisions were seen as the key
factors determining health status, with suggestions that those who smoked, drove cars, or
owned guns should pay increased taxes to compensate for the health effects of their choices
(87).
The social ecological model of human behavior was first proposed by Urie Bronfenbrenner in
1974 as an alternative to the dominant model of individual-focused experimental laboratory
research, which he argued had little relevance to human behavior in the world (88). Instead,
he argued that the human environment, including the immediate situation of the subject and
the larger formal and informal social contexts, should be considered when studying human
behavior. The subjects ecological environment, then, was a nested arrangement of [social]
structures, each contained within the next (88) Research settings then, could be considered
ecologically valid if the environmental properties theorized by the researcher aligned with
the environment as experienced by the subjects, and ecological experiments investigate the
interaction between subject and environment by contrasting environmental systems (88).
Like developmental psychology of the time, early work in health promotion focused primar-
ily on identifying individual risk factors and modifiable individual behaviors for intervention
(85). However, increasingly there was recognition of the link between peoples health and their
physical and social environments, leading a working group of the World Health Organization
defining health promotion as a mediating strategy between people and their environments,
synthesizing personal choice and social responsibility in health to create a healthier future
in 1984 (89). In 1988, McLeroy and colleagues introduced a social ecological model of health
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promotion and proposed that interventions in the field should target both the individual
and the individuals social environmental factors (90), drawing from the work of Urie Bron-
fenbrenner. McLeroy noted that the individual and social environmental factors each affect
one another through reciprocal causation, a key component of Bronfenbrenners theory (90).
This interdependence and interaction occurs across all levels of the health concern. McLeroy
identified these multiple levels of influence impacting a health concern as 1. Intrapersonal
factors, 2. Interpersonal processes formed by the individuals social networks, family, friends,
and co-workers, 3. Institutional factors such as the organizational characteristics of schools
and healthcare facilities, 4. Community factors, the relationships among organizations, and
5. Public policy, consisting of laws and government policies (90). In examining the social
ecology of MDRO spread, I will reference this formulation of Bronfenbrenners social ecology
model.
As an example of a social ecological model within public health, McLeroy and colleagues
pointed to the host-agent-environment model (90), which was popularized by Wade Hampton
Frost in 1928 (91). Often, the environmental factors in the model are construed narrowly,
for example, environmental factors described in a 2010 model of influenza transmission were
limited to descriptors of the very immediate environment such as surface area to volume
ratio and host density (92). However, by using a broader definition of the environment
which includes the social, cultural, and economic environments of the host at multiple levels,
it is possible to expand this model to examine the social ecology of infectious diseases. Mayer
and Pizer define the social ecology of infectious diseases as, the scientific study of the ways
by which human activities enable microbes to disseminate and evolve, creating favorable
conditions for the diverse manifestations of communicable diseases (93).
In the studies described here, I will examine the interaction of the intra-personal patient
(host) factors in the first level of the McLeroy model and institutional environmental factors
in the third level. Below, I propose an ecological model of CRE epidemiology showing how
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Figure 1.1: An Ecological Model of CRE Epidemiology
factors at three levels - the patient, the hospital, and the nursing home - interact through-
out inter-facility patient sharing to influence individual patient carriage of MDROs (Figure
1.1). This multi-level ecological model shows the interplay of the patient, the hospital, and
the nursing home characteristics resulting in MDRO carriage, in this example, during the
emergence of CRE in California. Patients carrying CRE have high rates of hospitalization
and nursing home residence, often moving back and forth between facilities via inter-facility
transfer. This strong association between hospital and nursing home stays and CRE car-
riage makes understanding the role of key characteristics of these social environmental set-
tings critical. A social ecological perspective of CRE epidemiology can improve targeting of
interventions for CRE prevention and control.
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1.7 Social Ecology of MDRO Spread: The Patient Level
For an infection to occur, there must be a host. Frosts epidemiologic triad named the host
as the first factor in the spread of infectious disease, and intrapersonal factors lie at the
inner-most nested level of social structures influencing health in McLeroys formulation of
Bronfenbrenners social ecological model. To spread MDROs, infected or colonized patients
must transmit their pathogens to other patients either directly or indirectly through health-
care worker contact or fomites. At the patient level, the ecological model proposed above
highlights patient age, gender, comorbidities, procedures, and insurance type as key char-
acteristics related to hospitalization and CRE carriage status. Many of the intrapersonal
characteristics in this model of CRE epidemiology have been implicated in prior studies of
endemic MDROs.
Age plays a key role in patient health status. Due to increased life expectancy and decreased
fertility, the United States population, much like that of other developed nations, is aging.
Beginning in 2011, the baby boomers will enter old age as they turn 65 (94). While the
percentage of the U.S. population over 65 is expected to increase 135% between 2000 and
2050, the percentage of the population over 85 is projected to make even greater gains,
increasing by 350% (95). The increase in the oldest-old group over age 85 is of particular
importance to public health, as these individuals typically require the most medical and long
term care (94; 95). As the population ages, the percentage of the population with chronic
disease is expected to rise, as will their need for healthcare (96). As these demographic and
epidemiologic transitions occur, the aging population will have greater exposure to healthcare
facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes, and thus be exposed to higher risk of adverse
medical events, such as colonization with healthcare-associated MDROs. Older patient age
has been associated with a greater risk of HAI in studies of endemic MDROs (97).
20
Comorbidities and procedures to place invasive medical devices are also key factors in
the spread of endemic MDROs. Invasive medical device use (98; 2; 99), including cen-
tral catheters (100), urinary catheters, and ventilators, is also significantly associated with
a higher risk of HAI. Other factors significantly associated with HAI were comorbidities
(97; 101; 102), receipt of dialysis (100), and stay on critical care units (2; 98; 99). Greater
antibiotic use also plays a role in HAI caused by MDROs (102), in terms of both number of
types of antibiotics (100) and duration of use (97), presumably because antibiotics promote
the growth of resistant organisms by eliminating competing organisms.
While these factors play a role in many HAI, the risk factors for CRE have not yet been well-
characterized, in part due to limitations posed by the small number of cases in prior studies.
One important factor for CRE spread is antibiotic use. A case-control study of patients
with no prior history of CRE in whom CRE was detected upon screening found colonization
with other MDROs and antibiotic exposure in the prior three months to be significant risk
factors for CRE in multivariable analysis (103). In a study of CRE in an Israeli tertiary
care hospital, poor functional status, ICU stay, and antibiotic receipt, especially receipt of
fluoroquinolones, were found to be independent risk factors for being a CRE carrier (75). In
the same study, 31% of cases were found to have previously received carbapenems compared
to 0% of controls, meaning that use of these antibiotics was significantly associated with
CRE carriage (75). In addition, comorbidities (104; 105) and medical devices have been
linked to CRE carriage (106). Certain patient procedures performed in healthcare facilities,
such as endoscopy, have been implicated in CRE outbreaks (107; 108; 109; 110). Further
investigation of the intrapersonal level factors that contribute to CRE spread is necessary to
better understand the interplay of these factors with those at the institutional level.
In addition to their direct effects on CRE risk, individual patient factors affect healthcare
service utilization including hospitalization, that is, intrapersonal factors affect patient ex-
posure to institutions and institutional level factors. Patient age, gender, comorbidities, and
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insurance type all have been shown to be related to healthcare service utilization. Specifically,
older people, women, and those with public only insurance coverage are disproportionately
represented among high utilizers of health care (111), as are those with multiple comorbidi-
ties (112). Through their association with healthcare utilization, patient level factors also
influence patient exposure to hospital and nursing home level risks; for example, they can
affect the duration the patient stays in the hospital, the procedures and treatments the pa-
tient is exposed to during their hospitalization and even the type of hospital at which they
stay.
1.8 Social Ecology of MDRO Spread: The Hospital
Level
Because CRE is currently believed to be circulating primarily within healthcare institutions,
factors at the institutional level of the social ecological model of infectious disease must be
examined. At the hospital institutional level, the ecological model shown above identifies
hospital-wide social environmental characteristics such as facility type, facility size, mean
length of stay, case mix, and percent of patients with other multi-drug resistant organisms as
altering a patients risk of acquiring CRE. Institutional level infection prevention techniques
also play a key role in controlling the spread of MDROs.
Certain facility types have been shown to be key locations for transmission and spread of
CRE. In particular, long term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) have been shown to be signif-
icantly more strongly associated with CRE carriage than short stay acute care hospitals. In
2009 in Israel, a country-wide study of post-acute care facilities found that skilled nursing
wards (similar to U.S. LTACHs) were found to have a CRE carriage prevalence of 25.9%
(103). In a study of 31 Chicago area hospitals between 2010 and 2011, the adjusted rela-
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tive risk of colonization with carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae was 5.94 for patients in
LTACHs compared with short stay hospitals (113). LTACHs were also found to be important
in the epidemiology of CRE in Los Angeles County during 2010 and 2011 when the incidence
rate for CRE was found to be 2.54 per 1,000 patient days in LTACHs and 0.31 per 1,000
patient days in short stay acute care hospitals (114). A CDC study of CRE central line
associated blood stream infections and catheter associated urinary tract infections reported
to the National Healthcare Safety Network found that a larger percentage of LTACHs than
short stay acute care hospitals reported CRE during 2012 (73).
Mean facility length of stay and hospital size are key institutional factors in CRE epidemi-
ology. In the Chicago study of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae, LTACHs were found
to longer lengths of stay suggesting that length of stay may be an institutional-level factor
that impacts the risk of CRE carriage (113). The CDC study of CRE infections associated
with medical devices also found that the fraction of hospitals reporting CRE increased with
hospital size, with 17.4% of hospitals with 500 or more beds reporting CRE (73). Hospital
volume has also been identified as a facility-level factor associated with healthcare associ-
ated C. difficile infection rates (115). This trend appears to hold across pathogen types, with
larger hospital size associated with higher overall rates of HAI (2).
Case-mix, or the mixture of the complexity levels of patients clinical conditions and conse-
quent resource use at a particular facility, also impacts the spread of MDROs. For example,
hospitals associated with medical schools are often tertiary care facilities which care for pa-
tients with more severe conditions than community hospitals. A greater fraction of hospitals
associated with medical schools reported CRE (9.5% versus 1.9% at hospitals not affiliated
with a medical school (73). One intervention that increases complexity in patient care is
mechanical ventilation. Mechanical ventilation was shown to occur at high rates in facilities
implicated in carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae spread in Chicago (113). Similarly, in
Israel, wards for patients requiring mechanical ventilation had a relatively high CRE preva-
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lence of 11.9% (103). In a study of C. difficile in California, case mix was identified as a
facility-level factor associated with infection rates (115).
Common elements of infection prevention programs associated with decreasing spread of
MDROs and HAI include healthcare worker hand hygiene, other hospital cleaning and san-
itation efforts, use of contact precautions, and isolation of patients with known infections.
In the Israeli study of LTACHs, three institutional factors, alcohol-based hand sanitizer in
patient rooms, proper glove use in standard precautions, and entry screening for CRE, were
associated with lower risk of CRE carriage (67). A 2009 review of 24 hospital-based studies
of hand hygiene conducted between 1977 and 2008 found that HAI decreased in 21/24 stud-
ies (116). In the 16 studies which evaluated the impact of hand hygiene campaigns, 15 found
that hand washing increased (116). Environmental cleaning, particularly of high-touch sur-
faces near vulnerable patients has been shown to be effective for control of HAI, often when
bundled with other infection control measures (117). Environmental contamination with
MRSA and VRE has been shown to be decreased by increased disinfectant use, cleaning ed-
ucation, and feedback (118). Another study showed that environmental cleaning education
reduced contamination of surfaces and healthcare worker hands with CRE and significantly
decreased the risk of transmission of VRE between patients in an MICU where VRE was
endemic (119). Significant decreases in infection incidence were also seen for C. difficile in
two studies of bleach disinfection for hospital wards on which C. difficile was highly endemic
(120; 121). Contact precautions, which require healthcare providers to don gowns and gloves
when caring for designated patients, are an important barrier in preventing the spread of
HAI. In a study of environmental and hand contamination from patients with VRE, when
healthcare workers entered the rooms of patients with VRE, those who did not wear gloves
contaminated their hands 37% of the time, versus 5% for those who wore gloves, a significant
difference (122). Separating patients known to carry pathogens from patients without those
pathogens is called isolation (123). Cohorting has been used as an isolation strategy in suc-
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cessful interventions which limited the spread of CRE in Israel and Chicago. Together, these
infection prevention policies can act as institutional factors limiting the spread of CRE.
In the 1990s, nursing homes continued to be identified as an important reservoir for antibi-
otic resistant bacteria entering hospitals. A study of hospitalized patients admitted over two
years between 1990 and 1992 found that, among patients with ESBL-producing E. coli and K.
pneumoniae, 64% were admitted from nursing homes and, among these, 89% carried EBSL-
producing bacteria upon admission (124). This type of patient movement between facilities
creates connections between hospital and nursing home factors contributing to CRE emer-
gence. This inter-facility patient sharing can be thought of as occupying the fourth nested
level of McLeroys social ecological model of health, community factors, or the relationships
among institutions.
1.9 Social Ecology of MDRO Spread: The Nursing
Home Level
As with hospitals, nursing home factors occupy the institutional level of the McLeroys model.
Nursing homes and their characteristics play an important role in the epidemiology of MDRO
emergence. Once resistant bacteria enter a nursing home, they often spread widely among
other residents (125). One of the earliest studies reporting infection surveillance in nursing
homes found that 12% of nursing home residents had an infection and that half of these were
acquired after the resident was admitted to the facility (126).
The first published hospital outbreak of antibiotic resistant bacteria that was attributed to
the spread of bacteria within nursing homes occurred with MRSA in 1969, raising the possi-
bility that nursing homes served as an MDRO reservoir (127). A study of VRE colonization
in a hospital and its affiliated nursing home found that while colonization rates increased
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from 9% to 22% in the nursing home over one year, while levels of colonization in the hospi-
tal remained consistent over this period (128). In particular, long term and post-acute care
facilities serve as important reservoirs of CRE, with one study showing more than half of
CRE positive isolates coming from these facilities (129) and another showing a high rate of
fecal carriage of CRE in long term care (50).
In the 1980s, a review of nursing home infection surveillance reported rates of infection be-
tween 3.4 and 6.7 infections/ 1000 patient (130) and in 2012 a national survey of nursing
homes found that MRSA carrier prevalence was 4.04% with an infection prevalence of 0.71%
(131). Antimicrobial use in nursing homes combined with inter-facility transfer between hos-
pitals and nursing homes has created a reservoir of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria in nursing
homes (132). Once antibiotic resistant bacteria arrive in nursing homes, many nursing home
level factors affect the extent of MDRO spread.
The ecological model proposed above considers facility size, case mix, and length of stay
as key characteristics affecting CRE carriage. The association of MDROs and facility size
is shown by modeling studies demonstrating that small nursing homes with low resident
turnover are most at risk for increasing MRSA prevalence levels once MRSA is introduced
from patient transfer from a hospital (133). When MDROs are introduced into nursing
homes via transfer of colonized or infected patients, and when exposure occurs through fre-
quent contact between nursing home residents both directly and through staff, large MDRO
burdens result in nursing homes (80). This effect is particularly strong in settings with low
patient turn-over (134). Some types of diagnoses are more associated with outbreaks and
transmission in nursing homes than others, suggesting that nursing home case mix also plays
an important role. A study of infection prevalence in 7 nursing homes in 1981 found that
rates of urinary and lower respiratory infection rates were similar to those reported from
hospitals, but rates of skin infections, conjunctivitis, and diarrhea were higher and clustered,
indicating that they were likely the result of outbreaks and potentially preventable (135).
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Another study found that nursing home MRSA transmission was associated with the percent
of patients with diabetes among all patients in the nursing home (134).
Infection control policies act at the nursing home institutional level as well as the hospital
level to impact the spread of CRE. Isolation of patients with antibiotic resistant infections in
private rooms can help control infections in nursing homes, but not all nursing homes have
such facilities available (136). CRE screening policy, decreased prevalence of CRE in facility,
and not sharing a room with a known carrier decreased risk of CRE carriage in a study of
long term care facilities (103). In a study which screened patients in Israel in 2009, 2/3 of
patients screening positive for CRE had no known history of CRE carriage (103), indicating
that screening can help identify patients who should be placed in contact precautions.
Policies and characteristics at the level of institutions such as nursing homes and hospitals
can greatly affect patients risk of being exposed to and subsequently becoming carriers of
MDROs such as CRE. At the community level, policies and characteristics of institutions
affect other institutions within the region. However, studies in one large county have shown
that more than 90% of patient sharing occurs indirectly, limiting communication between
facilities about patients MDRO status and thus their ability to create consistent infection
control policies (137). Inter-facility patient sharing must be considered in order to understand
the interaction of patient, institution, and community level factors in the epidemiology of
CRE emergence.
1.10 Social Ecology of MDRO Spread: Inter-facility
Patient Sharing
Once patients acquire MDROs, they spread these pathogens to other patients as they move
via inter-facility patient sharing, which represents a community level factor contributing to
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CRE emergence. In the United States, where private decision making has long been prized in
health policy (84) to the extent that patient choice has been shown to increase patient satis-
faction within HMOs, independent of the satisfaction ratings of individual physicians chosen
(138). This high cultural value placed on free choice of provider drives inter-facility patient
sharing in the United States, in contrast with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
where the majority of patients visit their local provider despite newer choice options. Many
factors affect patient choices of providers and movement between institutions via inter-facility
patient sharing. Cost plays a major role in patient choice of hospital, with the probability
of a patient choosing a particular hospital declining with increasing costs (139).Quality, wait
times, gate-keeping, facility location, and patient mobility are all believed to affect patient
choice of healthcare providers when costs are fixed (140) .
When patients with MDROs arrive in healthcare facilities, they increase the facilitys colo-
nization pressure, or the prevalence of patients with MDROs. Because patients with HAI
often have functional disabilities (141; 142) or are bedridden (99; 143), they require high lev-
els of nursing care (142; 144) and often have longer lengths of hospital stay (97; 102). After
interacting with patients harboring MDROs, healthcare workers unknowingly spread these
pathogens to other patients. This is likely why, in healthcare facilities, colonization pressure
is a risk factor for MDRO spread (145). As a result, previous patient exposure to healthcare
facilities whether through hospitalization (146; 147; 144) or nursing home residency (143) is
associated with higher risk of HAI.
Inter-facility patient sharing in the regional healthcare community constitutes a major and
material connection among the three levels of analysis in this model and plays an important
role in transmission of emerging pathogens, particularly those which are healthcare associated
(148). A study of direct inter-hospital Medicare patient transfers between ICUs in 2005
found that patient sharing among U.S. hospitals meant that 65% of the 3,306 hospitals
accepting Medicare could receive pathogens from any starting hospital (149). Depending
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on the transmissibility of the pathogen, modeling performed in this study showed that the
median time for spread between any two hospitals in the country was 3 years for a highly
infectious pathogen (149). Within one county, modeling has shown that an outbreak from
one hospital will have the majority of its effect on hospitals county-wide within six months
(150). In countries where hospitals share more patients diseases can spread more quickly
and the odds that an emerging organism will stop spreading without intervention is lower
(151).
Empirical studies strengthen the case for the importance of inter-facility patient sharing in
increasing patients exposure to pathogens demonstrated by modeling. Firstly, such studies
show that patient sharing is common. Prior research regarding endemic MDROs has shown
that patient sharing among hospitals and nursing homes is extensive (152). In one study,
among the 29% of patients who were admitted to a hospital more than once in a year have
been shown to move to a different hospital for the subsequent admission 75% of the time,
with 90% of inter-hospital patient sharing occurring indirectly, i.e. the patient was not
directly transferred from the first hospital to the second (153). Further, when hospitalized
Medicare patients are discharged from the hospital to skilled nursing facilities, more than
20% were re-hospitalized within 30 days (154). Secondly, patient-sharing does result in
pathogen-sharing. Inter-facility patient sharing has been shown to allow endemic MDROs
to spread across California (155). Empirical study of nosocomial bacteria strains (MRSA)
throughout healthcare facilities in one large county demonstrated that greater inter-hospital
patient sharing is associated with greater genetic similarity between strains (156).
When very ill patients enter hospitals from nursing homes, they can bring with them CRE
infections which are spread to other patients, causing hospital outbreaks (157). From hos-
pitals, these outbreaks of CRE can then spread when patients carrying the organism are
discharged to nursing homes (158). In order to stop the spread of dangerous pathogens
such as CRE, it is critical to examine how they spread during their first emergence within a
29
region. However, while free choice of provider and a lack of a centralized payer for health-
care drives inter-facility patient sharing in the United States, it also makes patient sharing
difficult to track. Unlike countries such as the U.K and the Netherlands, where patient refer-
ral information is readily available for research (151), tracking inter-facility patient transfer
in the United States requires piecing together data from multiple databases from different
sources. While the divided healthcare system drives inter-facility patient transfer and may
contribute to the spread of MDROs, it also makes these areas more difficult to study. Using
data from two large databases and seven hospitals to track inter-facility patient transfer, this
study examined CRE emergence in California guided by an ecological model with the aim
of identifying key sites for intervention at the patient, hospital, and nursing home levels.
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Chapter 2
Research Objectives
In order to address the public health concern of CRE, this project examined containment tar-
gets guided by a multi-level ecological model of CRE epidemiology. This model is designed to
investigate interplay of the patient, the hospital, and the nursing home characteristics result-
ing in pathogen carriage during the emergence of CRE in California. Specifically, I evaluated
the practice of patient sharing, taking into consideration patient characteristics, including
demographics, comorbidities, and insurance, and healthcare institution characteristics, in-
cluding facility type, size, and mean length of stay of patients. By examining factors at
multiple levels of influence in the epidemiology of CRE emergence in California, this project
sough to identify key leverage points for preventing the spread of CRE in newly emerging
settings through describing CRE epidemiology and exposure characteristics at one tertiary
care hospital; performance of case-control and cohort studies to identify factors at the pa-
tient and institutional levels; testing generalizability by expanding the analyses to all UC
hospitals; testing the relevance of CDC-mandated changes in CRE surveillance definition;
and finally, testing the efficacy of contact precaution policies at healthcare facilities.
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Chapter 3
Specific Aims
3.1 Aim 1: CRE Risk Factors and Healthcare Facility
Exposure of CRE Carriers at an Academic Medical
Center
3.1.1 Introduction
This section focuses on assessment of risk factors for CRE carriage by comparing CRE+
and CRE- patients in order to identify population targets for containing this pathogen, and,
second, quantitative evaluation of the spread of CRE as patients harboring CRE move via
inter-facility patient sharing between hospitals and nursing homes within a region.
Because inter-facility patient sharing plays such a major role in the spread of MDROs, infec-
tious disease surveillance is important for understanding their social ecology. While factors
involved the spread of endemic MDROs have been described extensively in the literature,
the ecology of emerging MDROs such as CRE is poorly understood.
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Given the high morbidity associated with ESBLs and CRE, the speed of their spread is
concerning. Between 2001, when the first case of CRE was identified in the United States,
and 2010, the number of HAI caused by CRE increased to 9,000 per year (78). In 2006, car-
bapenem resistance in Enterobacteriaceae was still rare in the United States (78). However,
now CRE infections have been reported in 44 states (78). During 2009-2010, only about
71% of Klebsiella spp., 66% of E. coli, and 73% of Enterobacter spp. reported to the NHSN
were tested for resistance to carbapenems (11). Of those that were tested, 12% of Klebsiella
spp., 2% of E. coli, and 4% of Enterobacter spp. were resistant to carbapenems (11). To
decrease the rate of CRE, surveillance in regions in which it is still emerging is necessary to
both quantify the current prevalence of CRE and identify targets for intervention.
One region where CRE is currently emerging is California, where it was first identified in
2010. As an example of CRE emergence in California, data from Gohil et al. show that
CRE presents a growing problem within Orange County, CA, with the number of new cases
increasing rapidly. Prior to 2012, the data from Gohil et al. show that no hospital had more
than ten newly positive CRE patients per year, but by 2013, two hospitals had identified more
than 30 each (159). However, while this survey of clinical culture results in one large county
found a rapidly increasing prevalence of CRE, cases were concentrated in a few facilities,
suggesting that it is still possible to prevent establishment of endemic CRE (160).
While CRE colonization and infection incidence appear to be growing within California, most
CRE cases identified in the Orange County hospitals are found within two days of hospital
admission, meaning that transmission likely did not occur in the diagnosing hospital (159).
Because of their timing, these CRE cases are designated as community-onset, but researchers
believe that these cases are still likely to be healthcare-associated from transmission within
nursing homes (161). The current project hopes to illuminate the degree of prior healthcare
exposure among these cases during the epidemic phase of an emerging pathogen in a large
region.
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Given the uncertainty about how CRE spreads between healthcare facilities so rapidly and
its mortality rates of up to 50% (76; 77), CRE is alarming to public health officials and
the general public (162). Despite this concern, CRE emergence is poorly understood and
few proactive infection control interventions have been implemented to prevent CRE from
gaining a foothold in non-endemic areas. This is because hospitals, nursing homes, and public
health departments most commonly wait until an emerging MDRO such as CRE becomes
an overt problem (e.g. widely endemic or producing outbreaks) before taking action to
reduce transmission. The current reactive responses to MDRO emergence avoid taking costly
measures to prevent infections which only affect small numbers of patients at a particular
point in time. However, such delays allow for dangerous pathogens like CRE to take root
within communities and become difficult to eradicate or even control.
The studies under Aim-1 evaluate empirical support for a paradigm shift to a more proactive
response by quantifying CRE burden and evaluating exposure pathways. If successful in
identifying targeted opportunities for early prevention, the results would strengthen the
argument for early intervention, with the goal of containing CRE before it becomes endemic.
According to the CDC, an early, coordinated approach may be needed with facilities working
together to prevent patient infection and prevent the spread of deadly MDROs such as
CRE (163). If identified and undertaken, appropriate containment strategies as part of a
coordinated response could prevent an estimated 74% of CRE infections in the next five
years (163).
The study of exposure pathways described here is grounded in an ecological framework
to examine factors at the patient, or intrapersonal, and institutional, nursing home and
hospital, levels. This study identified specific types of facilities and patients at high risk
for CRE exposure and acquisition. Identification of risk factors at the intrapersonal and
institutional levels highlights key targets for intervention in order to maximize the impact
of limited infection prevention resources are available for preventing an emerging pathogen.
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Given that the CDC is actively looking to re-evaluate its CRE toolkit recommendations,
the results presented in this chapter can provide guidance for a more pragmatic approach
to CRE containment. For example, identification of facilities at high risk of CRE could
allow the CDC to recommend that only these facilities screen their patients or that only
high risk patients be screened for CRE, making the recommendation more feasible for and
more acceptable to healthcare facilities. If CRE exposure is concentrated in select high risk
facilities, then focused early intervention efforts for CRE may become more feasible and
provide insight into activities that can benefit health departments and healthcare facilities
when faced with other novel emerging MDROs in the future. Thus, the theoretical findings
of this chapter also have direct pragmatic applications in MDRO containment.
3.1.2 Hypotheses
1. Prior healthcare facility exposure, particularly in nursing homes, will be strongly associ-
ated with a patient being a CRE carrier. This hypothesis is based on prior studies, described
in the introduction, which showed that long term care facilities were major drivers of CRE
spread in Chicago and Israel.
2. The small number of individual CRE cases in California access multiple healthcare fa-
cilities, resulting in substantial exposure and risk of spreading CRE in this region. This
hypothesis is based on prior studies of patient sharing in Southern California among pa-
tients with MRSA and other MDROs.
3. CRE carriage will be strongly associated with future nursing home exposure days. This
hypothesis is based on prior studies showing that patients with endemic MDROs have a high
degree of healthcare facility exposure.
35
3.1.3 Materials and Methods
CRE Epidemiology and Factors Associated with CRE Carriage
For Aim 1 Question 1, I conducted two case control studies to identify predictors of CRE
carriage. The study population was all patients admitted to UC Irvine Medical Center
(UCIMC) between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013. Cases were defined as patients
with a positive CRE culture (inpatient or outpatient) and at least one inpatient admission at
UCI Medical Center between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013. Positive CRE cultures
and their associated index admissions were identified as the admission which contained, or
was closest to, the date that a patient had a microbiology culture testing positive for CRE
according to the CDC 2015 surveillance definition: Enterobacteriaceae which are found to be
resistant to imipenem, meropenem, doripenem, or ertapenem by standard susceptibility test-
ing methods (i.e., minimum inhibitory concentrations of 4 mcg/mL for doripenem, imipenem
and meropenem or 2 mcg/mL for ertapenem). Three date-matched controls were selected for
each case by choosing the three admissions immediately following the case admission. Three
comorbidity-matched controls were selected for each case and were patients with admissions
with the same total Elixhauser Comorbidity Index (164) and major diagnostic category of
the primary diagnosis as cases.
CRE Exposure due to Inter-facility Patient Sharing
For Aim 1 Question 2, in order to describe the CRE exposure to healthcare facilities caused
by their movement, I conducted a descriptive cohort study to identify the frequency of
healthcare exposure days one year before and after the date of known CRE carriage. The
study population was all patients admitted to UC Irvine Medical Center (UCIMC) between
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013 who were known to be CRE carriers. The only
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patient exclusion criterion was lack of a unique patient identifier which would preclude
them from being linked into the California Hospital Discharge Database for assessment of
addition healthcare utilization. The identifier is missing from the database in cases in which
the patient did not have a social security number. Follow up time was truncated if patients
died prior to one year of follow up.
Factors Associated with Healthcare Facility Exposure
For Aim 1 Question 3, I conducted a case cohort study to identify predictors of the frequency
of healthcare exposure days one year after the date of first known CRE carriage. The base
study population was all patients admitted to UC Irvine Medical Center (UCIMC) between
January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013. In this population, I evaluated healthcare utiliza-
tion in hospitals and nursing homes for 365 days beyond hospital, or through December 31,
2013 (end of dataset), whichever came first. Cases were defined as patients with a positive
CRE culture (inpatient or outpatient) and at least one inpatient admission at UCI Medical
Center between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013. Positive CRE cultures and their
associated index admissions were identified as the admission which contained, or was closest
to, the date that a patient had a microbiology culture testing positive for CRE according
to the CDC 2015 surveillance definition: Enterobacteriaceae which are found to be resis-
tant to imipenem, meropenem, doripenem, or ertapenem by standard susceptibility testing
methods (i.e., minimum inhibitory concentrations of 4 mcg/mL for doripenem, imipenem
and meropenem or 2 mcg/mL for ertapenem). The full UCIMC cohort was comprised of all
index admissions of patients with unique database identifiers admitted to UCIMC between
2010 and 2013. Control patients could be represented in the cohort more than once, pro-
vided that each subsequent admission was at least 365 days after the discharge from the
prior admission included in the cohort. Similarly, case patients could serve as controls in the
37
cohort as long as they had an admission at least 365 days prior to their first positive CRE
culture.
Data Sources
In order to identify healthcare facility exposure days for patients with and without CRE
carriage, I had to link three data sets. These were: (1) line list of UCIMC patients with
CRE identified in a microbiology laboratory cultures according to the 2015 CDC surveillance
definition, (2) a line item hospitalization dataset from all hospitals in California, and (3) a
line item nursing home dataset from all nursing homes in California who receive any Medi-
care/Medicaid funding (essentially all nursing homes). Each of these datasets has patients
identified by a different unique patient study ID; thus programming logic was needed to link
study IDs across all three datasets.
Data for CRE carrier case patients were obtained from UCIMCs Clinical Microbiology Lab-
oratory and from the Epidemiology and Infection Prevention program and included the
following data elements: CRE and other MDRO test dates and results, microbiologic data
including date of culture, antimicrobial sensitivity testing, plus the patients medical record
number, gender, birthdate, and admission and discharge dates from all UCIMC hospitaliza-
tions within the defined study period. Similarly, gender, birthdate, admission and discharge
dates are also available from the hospitalization and nursing home datasets.
Line item hospitalization data from California was obtained from the Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development and referred to as the Hospitalization dataset. Use of
this dataset was approved by the University of California, Irvine Institutional Review Board
(UCI IRB) and the California Health and Human Services Agencys Committee for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects (CPHS). The OSHPD dataset identified each patient with a
unique, irreversibly encrypted identifier and, for each inpatient admission in the state, in-
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cluded patient level information such as hospitalization dates, demographic information,
birth date, ICD-9 diagnostic and procedure codes, and location category before and after
hospital admission (e.g., home, rehabilitation center, nursing home, assisted living facility,
jail, homeless).
The UCIMC laboratory and Hospitalization data set was also linked with nursing home data
for the study population. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Research
Data Assistance Center provides line item nursing home data for all residents residing in
nursing homes that receive any CMS reimbursement. This dataset will be referred to as the
Nursing Home dataset, which was used under a data use agreement with Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services with approval from the UCI IRB. The nursing home dataset included
information from each nursing home visit in the state, such as gender, birth date, admission
and discharge dates, demographic information, residential zip code, ICD-9 diagnostic and
procedure codes, antibiotic use, activities of daily living, and other descriptors of social
interaction and mobility.
Algorithmic Linking Methods
While the hospitalization and nursing home datasets each have unique patient identifiers
to allow tracking of patients within hospitals or within nursing homes, I needed to link the
two datasets to identify CRE carriers in the nursing home data set and to track patients as
they moved between hospitals and nursing homes. Without this linkage, it would not have
been possible to find the nursing home patient identifiers for CRE carriers or to detect direct
transfers from hospitals to nursing homes or vice versa.
A similar dataset linking methodology for the study of exposure to multiple healthcare fa-
cilities was successfully used by Datta et al. to examine exposure from inter-facility patient
sharing of patients harboring endemic pathogens which cause HAI (111). In their method-
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ology, matches between hospital and nursing home identifiers were assigned when a patient
with the same date of birth and gender had a hospital discharge date within seven days
of a hospital admission. In their study population, 85% of patients who were recorded in
the hospital dataset as being discharged to a nursing home were successfully matched to a
nursing home admission in the nursing home dataset (113). While this method of matching
has good sensitivity, it is not necessarily specific and can result in multiple matches, in which
one hospital identifier is matched to more than one nursing home identifier. These multiple
matches were previously resolved for hospitalized cases by manually assessing whether co-
morbidities listed for the potential nursing home match were consistent with those given for
the patient in the hospital dataset.
Modifications to the linking method of Datta et al. were necessary for this study because
manual review to resolve multiple matches was not feasible for the more than 35,000 patients
in the studies described here. Because manual review was not used to assess the quality
of hospital-nursing home identifier pairs, an algorithm was created to broadly identify all
possible matching identifier pairs, assign them an initial rank score, eliminate implausible
matches, and finally choose the best match.
Identifying Putative Identifier Pair Matches and Assigning the Initial Match
Score
In order to track patient healthcare utilization and movement between facilities over the
study period, it was necessary to link each patient identifier from the hospital dataset with
the corresponding identifier for the same patient in the nursing home dataset. A linking
algorithm was used to test several putative identifier pair matches to find the correct match-
ing pair of corresponding identifiers. While Datta et al. selected putative matches only
among patients with a transfer from a hospital to a nursing home, in the updated version,
initial putative matches were found by matching on at least one potential transfer in either
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direction. The transfer could occur in either direction, either a hospital discharge date with
a nursing home admission date within seven days or a nursing home discharge date with a
hospital admission date within seven days.
I used gender, birthdate, and facility admission and discharge dates to perform the initial
putative linkage. For example, a patient who left a hospital would be matched to a resident
with the same gender, date of birth and nursing home admission date within seven days
of the hospital discharge. The rationale for the 7 day gap is that patients might not have
moved directly between hospitals and nursing homes upon hospital discharge. For example,
a patient with high care needs might have attempted to return home initially but their
caregivers soon realized that the level of care needed was beyond what could be provided at
home and the patient instead went to a nursing home.
Once putative matches (hospital-nursing home patient identifier pairs) were identified, a
match score was assigned for each pair. The match score was the number of potential
transfers identified based on admission and discharge dates. While Datta et al. considered
any putative pair with at least one match, this algorithm counted how many times each pair
matched. For example, a putative identifier pair consisting of one hospital discharge followed
closely by a nursing home admission was given a match score of 1, while a hospital discharge
followed closely by a nursing home admission and then a discharge from the nursing home
followed closely by a hospital admission with the original hospital identifier was given a
match score of 2. This scoring scheme was based on the assumption that a putative match
identifiers linked by larger numbers of potential transfers were less likely to be spurious than
a pair linked by only one transfer, and, thus, more likely to truly represent the same patient.
Although this initial match score was able to rank and thus automatically resolve most
multiple matches, occasionally, often in cases where a hospital identifier had multiple putative
nursing home identifier matches based on only one transfer each, there were ties that could
not be resolved by the match score alone. In these cases, a date difference score was used to
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resolve ties. The date difference score was calculated by counting the sum of the number of
days between the discharge and admission dates for every transfer identified for the putative
match. This was based on the assumption that, all else being equal, fewer days of difference
in between a discharge and admission was mostly likely to represent a true transfer of the
same patient and thus a true match. For example, a putative pair is more likely to be a true
match when a hospital discharge and nursing home admission occur on the same day, rather
than seven days later. Initial matching and calculation of match scores and date difference
scores were performed using the statistical analytic software suite SAS 9.3.
To evaluate the algorithm iteratively as new versions were created, difficult test cases were
selected and manually reviewed to determine the correct hospital-nursing home identifier pair
matches. Difficult test cases were those in which a hospital identifier had a large number
of possible nursing home matches; typically these were patients with common dates of birth
and frequent hospitalization. At each phase, the algorithms assigned matches were compared
against the manually assigned goal standard matches and any failures were reviewed to
identify areas for improvement of the algorithm. Ultimately, the algorithm was able to
automatically eliminate multiple matches and perform as well as manual review on test
cases, eliminating the need for manually resolution of multiple matches.
Match Scoring Challenges and Eliminating Double Counting
Once the match score algorithm was created, testing was performed to validate the identi-
fier pair matches assigned. While the matching score and date difference tie-breaker score
successfully identified most matched pairs correctly, review of cases in which the algorithm
selected the incorrect match for difficult test cases showed that anomalies occasionally oc-
curred in calculation of the match score, resulting in an inflating match score. Further
investigation showed that this inflation arose when a patient had numerous very short hospi-
talizations and nursing home stays during a short time period. In these cases, the algorithm
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would increment the match score for all admissions within seven days of discharge, rather
than just the nearest one. Thus, one discharge could result in multiple putative transfers
and thus gain multiple match score points for a putative pair.
To eliminate this double-counting, it was necessary to track which discharges had already
contributed to the match score by identification of a putative transfer. Additionally, to
ensure that the nearest possible admission to each discharge was selected as the putative
transfer, the date difference for each possible admission discharge pair had to be minimized.
Thus, the algorithm was modified so that every time a putative discharge-admission transfer
was identified, a check was performed to see whether a putative transfer had already been
identified using that discharge date. If it had not been previously used, the match score
was incremented and the difference between the admission and discharge dates was added
to the total date difference score. If the discharge date had previously been used, the date
difference score of the previous putative transfer and the current one were compared. If
the date difference score of the previous putative transfer was lower, the algorithm would
not count the current putative transfer and would move on. If the date difference score of
the previous putative transfer was higher, the algorithm would not change the match score
(since a point had already been added for the discharge being used), but it would subtract
the date difference score of the previous putative transfer from the total date difference score
for the identifier pair and add the lower date difference score of the current putative transfer
instead.
While these changes increased the complexity of the matching algorithm, they ensured that
the match scores were accurate and that the date difference scores reflected transfers with the
fewest days between admission and discharge. As before, match scores and date difference
scores were calculated using SAS 9.3, and the algorithms assigned matches were validated
against manually evaluated matches.
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Eliminating Implausible Matches and Choosing the Best Match
Allowing transfers to be identified within a seven day range increased sensitivity by ensuring
that a larger fraction of the true hospital-nursing home identifier pairs could be identified.
It allowed for capture of linkages in cases in which a patient leaving a hospital initially
went home before moving to nursing care and in cases where there were slight discrepancies
between hospital and nursing home records. However, the cost of this increased sensitivity
was decreased specificity caused by an increase in spurious matches.
Review of test cases showed that the initial match score alone was not sufficient to exclude
these matches which appeared spurious on manual review due to a high degree of overlap
between hospital and nursing home visits. The algorithm was modified to eliminate putative
matches with a high degree of overlap and modify the match score of putative matches with
smaller degrees of overlap to allow for more accurate ranking. All potential matches in
which the overlap between hospital and nursing home stays exceeded 20% of the possible
overlap time were eliminated. This cut-off was selected based on empirical testing which
showed that this successfully segregated pairs manually determined to be true matches from
those deemed spurious and was verified on a second set of test cases. The match score for
each remaining potential pair was pro-rated to account for overlap by multiplying the match
score by (1-overlap %). Because of the limitations of SAS, days of overlap and total possible
overlap were calculated using Python 3.4, a programming language often used in scientific
research and commercial software development.
Finally, potential pairs were ranked on their match score, with ties broken by date difference
scores, selecting the pairs with the most putative transitions in which the transitions had
the fewest days between discharge from one facility and admission to another. Ranking was
performed using SAS 9.3, and the results were compared against manual review of matches
as described previously. Ultimately, the algorithm was able to automatically eliminate mul-
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tiple matches via this ranking system and perform as well as manual review on test cases,
eliminating the need for manually resolution of multiple matches.
Once the best match was selected for a particular hospital identifier, the unique nursing home
identifiers allowed for selection of all nursing home visits for the matching patient during the
study period. This final linkage of the hospitalization and nursing home identifiers allowed
all hospitalizations and nursing home visits for that linked identifier pair within the hospital
and nursing home datasets to be assigned to one patient.
3.1.4 Data Analyses and Outcomes
CRE Epidemiology and Factors Associated with CRE Carriage
In order to answer question 1, I sought to examine the risk factors associated with the out-
come of CRE carriage. When evaluating variables associated with CRE carriage for Aim
1 Question 3, I considered the following variables: age, gender, race, insurance type, CMS
major diagnostic category of the primary diagnosis, surgical procedures during the index
visit, length of stay for the index visit, and Elixhauser comorbidity classifications. Surgical
procedures were classified using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Health-
care Cost and Utilization Projects Clinical Classifications Software (165). For categorical
variables I used chi squared tests, and for continuous variables, I used logistic regression to
evaluate factors described above as independent variables for association with CRE carriage,
and independent variables meeting a cutoff of p 0.1 were advanced to the final model. Lo-
gistic regression was performed using SAS 9.3 to test the association between the dependent
variable (outcome) of CRE carriage and independent variables, including age at admission,
sex, race, ethnicity, insurance type, length of stay in the admission in which the patient
tests positive for CRE, prior healthcare exposure, CMS MDC of the primary diagnosis,
comorbidities, and whether the patient had a surgical procedure.
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CRE Exposure due to Inter-facility Patient Sharing
To evaluate the outcome of CRE spread from CRE carriers from one academic medical
center in terms of patient days of exposure, number of hospitals and nursing homes exposed,
and number of counties exposed, the exposure due to CRE carriers in healthcare facilities
across a region was calculated with the number of days a patient is in healthcare facilities
following their first positive CRE culture as the numerator and the days of follow up until
the patients death or the end of the dataset. Following dataset linkages as described above,
the movement of patients known to harbor CRE pathogens from an academic medical center
to regional healthcare facilities and counties throughout California was evaluated to quantify
the burden of CRE emergence. For Aim 1 Question 2, descriptive statistics were used to
assess the number of hospitals and nursing homes in which UCIMC CRE carrier patients
stayed and their lengths of stay, stratifying exposures prior to and following the index visit
(the visit in which each case patient had their first positive CRE culture). The extent of
CRE spread was also examined at the county level.
In order to better understand the types of healthcare facilities visited by CRE carriers, facility
characteristics for hospitals and nursing homes with CRE exposure were described, including
facility type (short stay acute care hospital, long-term acute care hospitals, which are the
facility type implicated in outbreaks in areas of endemic CRE spread, nursing home), facility
size and average LOS, and measures of facility case mix (% of common comorbidities, % with
major surgery). For each discharged patient, all hospital admissions and nursing home stays
in any California healthcare facility for one year prior to and one year following the patients
initial positive CRE culture were assessed. Healthcare exposure days were assessed according
to a patients CRE status.
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CRE Epidemiology and Factors Associated with Healthcare Facility Exposure
To evaluate the modifiable and non-modifiable risk factors associated with healthcare facil-
ity exposure, I examined the association between the outcome of post-discharge days spent
in healthcare facilities and intra-personal level and institutional level characteristics. When
evaluating variables associated with future healthcare exposure days in hospitals and nursing
homes following index admission for Aim 1 Question 3, I compared the fraction of patients
with each characteristic using t-tests for binary variables and the fractions of the patients
in each category using ANOVA testing for categorical variables. I tested for associations
between the outcome of post-discharge healthcare facility exposure and continuous indepen-
dent variables described above using simple linear regression. Independent variables meeting
a cutoff of p 0.1 were advanced to the final model. Poisson regression was performed using
SAS 9.3 to test the association between the dependent variable (outcome) of post-discharge
days per day of follow up spent in healthcare facilities and independent variables, including
whether the patient was a CRE carrier, age at admission, sex, race, ethnicity, insurance
type, primary diagnosis, surgery, prior healthcare exposure stratified by facility type, length
of stay, and comorbidity score.
3.1.5 Results
CRE Epidemiology and Factors Associated with CRE Carriage
UCI had 13,977 admissions per year during the study period for patients with valid unique
identifiers. Of these UCI patients with identifiers, 4.5% were children and 95.5% were adults.
Prior work has shown that in the hospital admissions database used, 75% of hospitalizations
in Orange County, where UCI is located, had valid unique identifiers, or record linking
numbers (166). The majority of admissions without record linking numbers were for children,
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with 63% of such admissions being for infants under 6 months of age; among admissions of
adults, 92% had record linking numbers (166).
Among all patients admitted to UCIMC between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013,
74 patients were determined to be CRE carriers based on microbiology laboratory results
interpreted using the 2015 CDC definition for CRE. Of these patients, 61 had valid unique
identifiers in the OSHPD data and were examined in the remaining analysis. Of the 13
patients without identifiers 62% were female, 69% were white, 54% were Hispanic, and 31%
had private insurance coverage. The mean age of these patients without identifiers was 46
years old.
The 61 cases with identifiers were identified as cases for the case-control studies. Compar-
ative statistics were calculated for factors at patient level among CRE carriers along with
their admission date-matched, non-CRE carrier controls (the 3 non-CRE carriers admitted
immediately after the CRE carrier) and comorbidity-matched controls for comparison (Table
3.1). Compared to date-matched controls, CRE cases had higher mean age and number of
comorbid conditions (Elixhauser Comorbidity Index). They were more likely to be female,
black, and insured by Medicare. CRE cases were more likely to have a primary diagnosis
classified as infectious, respiratory, or renal/urinary and to have undergone a surgical proce-
dure, especially those on the respiratory or musculoskeletal systems. Of the 61 case patients
with identifiers, 19 died within 365 days of discharge from their index admission, a mortality
rate of 31%.
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Inpatients by CRE Status, California 2010-13
Characteristic CRE + Date matched
Controls
Comorbidity
matched
Controls
Age (mean (SD)) 63 (17) 50 (21) 60 (18)
Female gender 52% 48% 49%
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Race
White 67% 74% 72%
Asian 16% 13% 15%
Black 5% 2% 1%
Other 11% 10% 9%
Hispanic ethnicity 23% 28% 31%
Insurance type
Medicare 51% 35% 40%
Medicaid 20% 24% 23%
Private 18% 27% 15%
Indigent Programs 3% 9% 14%
Self Pay 3% 3% 4%
All Other 5% 3% 4%
Length of Stay (mean (sd)) 29 (34) 9 (15) 12 (22)
Primary diagnosis type
Infectious 23% 1% 24%
Respiratory 13% 5% 14%
Renal/Urinary 11% 4% 12%
Circulatory 8% 11% 8%
Hepatobiliary 8% 3% 8%
Burns 7% 2% 5%
Nervous 5% 14% 5%
Digestive 5% 13% 5%
Trauma 5% 3% 5%
Musculoskeletal 3% 5% 2%
Other 11% 38%* 13%
Surgery
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Respiratory 18% 2% 9%
Cardiovascular 10% 7% 7%
Digestive 8% 10% 8%
Musculoskeletal 7% 3% 3%
Integumentary 5% 3% 3%
Total Elixhauser Groups (mean
(sd))
4 (2) 2 (2) 4 (2)
Elixhauser Comorbidity Groups
Hypertension Uncomplicated 33% 28% 38%
Renal Failure 28% 8% 19%
Cardiac Arrhythmia 26% 16% 25%
Weight Loss 26% 11% 16%
Hypertension Complicated 25% 7% 18%
Congestive Heart Failure 23% 7% 17%
Diabetes Uncomplicated 18% 15% 19%
Coagulopathy 16% 5% 9%
Obesity 16% 6% 13%
Other Neurological Disorders 15% 9% 14%
*Primarily mental disorders, pregnancy, and endocrine disorders
Two case-control analyses were performed to test for an association between prior healthcare
facility exposure and CRE carrier status, when controlling for other potential CRE risk
factors. In the first case-control study, cases were compared to their admission date-matched
controls. Bivariate testing showed significant associations between a positive CRE carrier
status and the following variables: age at admission, prior hospital exposure (days of stay at
hospitals prior to index admission), length of stay in the admission in which the patient tests
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positive for CRE, Elixhauser comorbidity score, CMS MDC, and whether the patient had a
surgical procedure involving the cardiovascular or respiratory systems. Procedures classified
as cardiovascular included heart valve procedures, coronary artery bypass graft (CABG),
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), coronary thrombolysis, cardiac
catheterization, coronary arteriography, cardiac pacemaker, vascular catheterization, bypass,
or shunt, and embolectomy or endarterectomy. Procedures classified as respiratory included
tracheostomy, tracheoscopy and laryngoscopy with biopsy, lobectomy or pneumonectomy,
lung or bronchus biopsy, incision of pleura, thoracentesis, and chest drainage. Time spent in
nursing homes prior to the index admission was not significantly associated with CRE carrier
status. The significantly associated independent variables were advanced to a multivariable
logistic regression model, and the final model showed that age in decades (p <0.001), length
of index admission per ten days (p = 0.007), cardiovascular surgery (p = 0.007), respiratory
surgery (p = 0.004), and days in the hospital per ten days in the 180 days prior to index
admission (p = 0.001) were significantly associated with a positive CRE carrier status.
The second case-control study examined the independent variables associated with CRE
when cases to controls matched on admitting diagnosis and comorbidity score. Bivariate
testing showed significant associations between a positive CRE carrier status and the fol-
lowing variables: age at admission, prior hospital exposure, length of index admission, and
whether the patient had surgery on the musculoskeletal, respiratory, or cardiovascular sys-
tems during the index admission. These independent variables were advanced to the final
analysis using a multivariable logistic regression model, which showed that length of stay
during the index admission was significantly associated with a patient being a CRE carrier
(OR 1.16-2.04, p = 0.003, per 10 day increase in length of stay).
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CRE Exposure due to Inter-facility Patient Sharing
Tracking the movement of the 61 case patients known to harbor CRE pathogens from the
academic medical center to regional healthcare facilities and counties throughout California
showed that these 61 patients spent 1907 days in 18 hospitals and 16 nursing homes in 5
counties in the year following their index admission. Case exposure to healthcare facilities
in the 90, 180, and 365 days prior to and following positive CRE culture is shown in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2: Extent of CRE Patient Exposure by Facility Type, Stratified by Timing Relative
to First CRE+ Culture
Prior to CRE
+
After CRE +
181-
365d
91-
180d
90d 90d 91-
180d
181-
365d
Rate of facility visits
(per 100 days of follow up) 0.16 0.35 1.54 1.80 0.39 0.19
Distinct healthcare facilities 17 20 35 26 12 11
Distinct hospitals 12 13 25 14 8 5
Distinct nursing homes 5 7 10 12 4 6
Healthcare facility visits 33 37 83 70 29 25
Hospital visits 26 28 70 44 23 16
Nursing home visits 7 9 13 26 6 9
Hospital LOS* (mean) 11.92 13.28 11.81 11.27 9.69 9.84
Hospital LOS (sd) 12.17 13.05 13.17 9.86 8.82 10.58
Nursing home LOS (mean) 29.38 24.68 20.62 10.31 16.50 26.59
Nursing home LOS (sd) 31.10 22.77 15.73 10.52 22.34 49.66
Hospital exposure days 1478 1301 827 496 649 817
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Nursing home exposure days 852 543 268 268 528 1,090
Days of follow up** 20,296 10,676 5,399 3,892 7,500 13,420
*LOS = length of stay, raw exposure days, not accounting for patient deaths or loss to follow
up
**Limited by death in 19 patients.
Altogether, in the year prior to and following their index visit with CRE, CRE carriers visited
39 acute care hospitals, 7 long term acute care hospitals (LTACHs), and 51 nursing homes.
Institutional level descriptors for these facility types are shown in Table 3.3. As would be
expected based on the facility types, hospitals had shorter lengths of stay than LTACHs
and nursing homes. The case-mix descriptors (percent of patients with certain surgery and
comorbidity types) showed that a larger percent of acute care hospital patients underwent
surgery, while LTACHs had a larger fraction of patients with diabetes, renal failure, and
congestive heart failure. At the facility level, stratifying exposures prior to and following
positive CRE culture are shown in Table 3.2. The evaluation of the extent of CRE spread at
the county level showed that 5 California counties were exposed to CRE by the movement
of patients from one academic medical center to hospitals in those counties (Table 3.4).
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Hospitals and Nursing Homes Visited by CRE Carriers
Hospital LTACH Nursing
Home
Facilities Visited 39 7 61
Mean Facility Size (distinct
patients/year)
7,215 817 385
Mean LOS* 4.7 27.0 57.7
% with Surgery 31% 9% 5%
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Comorbidities
Hypertension 35% 38% 31%
Diabetes 17% 32% 27%
Renal Failure 15% 34% 1%
Congestive Heart Failure 14% 35% 9%
*Raw exposure days, not accounting for patient deaths or loss to follow up
Table 3.4: Extent of CRE Exposure by County and Time Relative to Index Admission (In
Patient-Days) and Hospital County
Los Angeles Orange Riverside Sutter Yuba
365 days prior 482 888 104 4 .
180 days prior 414 801 82 4 .
90 days prior 285 481 61 . .
90 days following 91 379 23 . 3
180 days following 112 500 29 . 8
360 days following 112 666 31 . 8
Factors Associated with Healthcare Facility Exposure
Comparisons of factors at patient level among CRE carriers and the full cohort are shown
in Table 3.5. Compared to CRE negative patients, cases had significantly higher mean
age, length of stay, and number of comorbid conditions (Elixhauser Comorbidity Index).
Cases were more likely to have a primary diagnosis classified as infectious, respiratory, or
renal/urinary and to have undergone a surgical procedure, particularly those involving res-
piratory system.
Table 3.5: Characteristics of UCI Inpatients by CRE Status, 2010-2013
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Characteristic CRE Positive
(%)
CRE Negative
(%)
Age (mean (SD)) 63 (17) 50 (21)
Female gender 52% 52%
Race
White 67% 73%
Asian 16% 13%
Black 5% 3%
Other 11% 10%
Hispanic ethnicity 23% 27%
Insurance type
Medicare 51% 31%
Medicaid 20% 22%
Private 18% 28%
Indigent Programs 3% 11%
Self Pay 3% 3%
All Other 5% 3%
Length of Stay (mean (sd)) 29 (34) 5 (9)
Primary diagnosis type
Infectious 23% 4%
Respiratory 13% 5%
Renal/Urinary 11% 5%
Circulatory 8% 9%
Hepatobiliary 8% 5%
Burns 7% 2%
Nervous 5% 11%
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Digestive 5% 9%
Trauma 5% 2%
Musculoskeletal 3% 9%
Other 11% 39%*
Surgery
Respiratory 18% 2%
Cardiovascular 10% 6%
Digestive 8% 8%
Musculoskeletal 7% 5%
Integumentary 5% 2%
Total Elixhauser Groups (mean (sd)) 4 (2) 2 (2)
Elixhauser Comorbidity Groups
Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders 41% 16%
Hypertension Uncomplicated 33% 32%
Renal Failure 28% 7%
Cardiac Arrhythmia 26% 14%
Weight Loss 26% 6%
Hypertension Complicated 25% 6%
Congestive Heart Failure 23% 7%
Diabetes Uncomplicated 18% 15%
Coagulopathy 16% 5%
Obesity 16% 8%
*Primarily pregnancy and mental disorders.
The healthcare facility exposure of the CRE cases and cohort were also compared. The
fraction of time spent in healthcare facilities is shown in Figure 3.1 for both cases and the
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Figure 3.1: Percent of Days Spent in Healthcare Facilities Relative to Index Admission
full UCIMC cohort. The exposure due to CRE carriers in healthcare facilities across a
region was calculated as the number of days patients are in healthcare facilities over the
denominator of the number of days of follow up (truncated for patients who die in the year
following their first positive CRE culture).
In the case cohort study of UCI patients, I found that cases compared to the population
cohort of UCI inpatients were more likely to have the following characteristics on bivariate
testing. For continuous variables, I found that higher patient age at index admission, higher
total Elixhauser Comorbidity Index, longer length of index admission, and more time spent
in both hospitals and nursing homes prior to the index admission were associated with a
greater length of time spent in healthcare facilities following index admission (all p <0.001).
For dichotomous variables, I found CRE carriage (p=0.03), female gender, non-Hispanic
ethnicity, respiratory surgery, or cardiovascular surgery (all p <0.001) spent significantly
more time in healthcare facilities following index admission. For categorical variables, the
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number of days spent in healthcare facilities following index admission differed significantly
with race, insurance type, and major diagnostic category of the patients primary diagnosis at
the index admission (all p <0.001). The final multivariable Poisson regression model showed
that number of follow up days in healthcare facilities post-discharge per day of follow up
was significantly associated with whether the patient was a CRE carrier, age at admission,
prior healthcare exposure in hospitals and in nursing homes, length of index admission, and
comorbidity score (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6: Patient and Prior Facility Characteristics Associated with Percentage of Follow-up
Spent in Healthcare Facilities
Characteristic Model Estimate* P-value
CRE Carriage 0.32 <0.001
Hospital Visit 1 Year Prior 0.31 <0.001
Nursing Home Stay 1 Year Prior 0.83 <0.001
Age (per 10 year) 0.18 <0.001
Elixhauser Comorbidity Index 0.10 <0.001
Length of Index Admission (per
10 days)
0.15 <0.001
*For example, for each 10-year increase in patient age, the patients rate of healthcare visits
(days in healthcare facilities per day of follow-up time after index admission) would increase
by a factor of 1.20 (i.e., e0.18)
A case-control study was conducted in order to assess whether the burden of healthcare
exposure of CRE carrier patients following index admission remained significantly higher
than that of the cohort when matching cases with controls on comorbidity score and prior
healthcare exposure. In bivariate testing, simple linear regression showed that longer length
of index admission was associated with a greater length of time spent in healthcare facilities
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following index admission (p = 0.007). No other independent variables were significantly
associated with healthcare facility exposure following index admission.
3.1.6 Discussion
These studies began necessary surveillance in a region in which CRE is still emerging to both
quantify the current prevalence of CRE and identify targets for intervention. Specifically,
these studies performed retrospective surveillance for CRE among clinical microbiology cul-
tures from one academic medical center in a region where CRE is emerging with the goal of
understanding the social ecology of emerging MDROs. The results confirm the importance
of CRE containment by demonstrating its high mortality and extensive spread, while sug-
gesting targets for intervention at the intra-personal and institutional levels by identifying
factors associated with both CRE carriage and with future healthcare facility exposure.
The emergence of CRE places a high burden of infectious spread on the healthcare system,
putting many patients at risk of contracting a pathogen associated with high mortality.
The 31% overall mortality rate among CRE cases in this study, which likely underestimates
the true mortality because it only includes deaths occurring in hospitals or nursing homes,
demonstrates the threat CRE poses. A mortality rate of 31% or more, as found in prior
studies, is the human burden that would come with allowing this dangerous pathogen to
become endemic.
Because of their high exposure to healthcare facilities, a small number of CRE cases can
expose many healthcare facilities and contribute to the rapid emergence of CRE. Despite
the fact that many more cases than controls died in the year following admission, resulting
in shorter follow up periods for cases, cases still spent more than three times as many
days in healthcare facilities follow admission than controls. Results from the cohort study
described here showed that CRE carrier patients spend a significantly greater percentage of
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their time following hospitalization in healthcare facilities, even with controlling for other
factors, resulting in a high burden of CRE exposure to facilities. The 61 CRE cases produced
an average of 52 days of healthcare facility CRE exposure in the year following their index
admission, bringing CRE to 18 hospitals and 16 nursing homes in four counties. Although
the total number of CRE carriers identified in the study was 61, these patients generated
a tremendous amount of CRE exposure in healthcare facilities despite high mortality rates,
indicating the importance of early action toward CRE containment.
These results show that CRE is emerging and rapidly gaining a foothold in Southern Califor-
nia. Southern California is currently in a period of potential for containment of CRE. Given
the high mortality of and rapid exposure to CRE seen in these data, public health officials
should consider whether to take proactive steps and take deliberate action. Whether it is
ultimately decided that containment efforts should be pursued or that the benefits of pre-
venting CRE from becoming endemic do not justify the costs, the decision deserves serious
consideration.
Faced with this evidence of concrete consequences of inaction on CRE emergence, public
health departments and healthcare facilities may decide to contain the spread of CRE. How-
ever, even with high levels of motivation and impetus to act based on this quantification of
the burden of CRE, health departments and healthcare facilities are unlikely to be able to
muster a great deal of funding for a novel, proactive approach to a disease which is, as yet,
uncommon. For example, currently, the CDC recommends screening all patients for CRE as
a method for infection prevention; however, given the limited resources for CRE prevention
mentioned above, facilities do not robustly adhere to these CDC CRE toolkit recommen-
dations. Therefore, given that limited resources are available for this change in the public
health response to MDROs, more targeted, cost-effective interventions must be identified.
To better direct the effort to identify key sites for intervention, the studies described here
relied on a multi-level ecological model. Results of the examination of CRE epidemiology
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showed how the intrapersonal level factor of CRE carriage can result in large institutional
level exposures to CRE via the community level phenomenon of inter-facility patient shar-
ing. Hospitals are the facilities where patients are more likely to have clinical or screening
cultures that reveal their CRE status, so currently they are the sites on which current CRE
containment efforts are focused. However, nursing homes, which generally do not screen
patients, have an uncounted burden. More than half (57%) of the facility exposure days
found in this study were in nursing homes. Thus, any CRE containment intervention must
include nursing homes, rather than focusing solely on hospitals.
Prior studies of CRE emergence in this region found that most CRE cases were community-
onset, i.e. occurring within two days of hospital admission, despite the belief of researchers
that these cases were, in fact, healthcare associated. This study showed that, prior to
testing positive for CRE, CRE carrier patients were exposed to a large number of healthcare
facilities. On average, each CRE carrier spent over one month of the year prior to their
positive culture in healthcare facilities. This study showed that there was a high degree
of prior healthcare exposure among these cases during the epidemic phase of an emerging
pathogen in a large region.
Risk factors for CRE at the intrapersonal, or patient, and institutional, or hospital and
nursing home, levels were assessed, and patient primary diagnosis, comorbidity score, age,
length of index admission, surgery, and prior stay in hospitals, but not in nursing homes,
were found to have a significant association with being a CRE carrier. These findings should
be used to assess which types of public health interventions might be best suited to prevent
the spread of CRE. In particular, interventions should likely be targeted to patients with
long lengths of hospital inpatient stay and high comorbidity.
This study had several limitations. First, it was not possible to determine the exact time at
which patients first became CRE carriers due to a lack of CRE screening. However, even if
screening were conducted on all patients, patients may carry CRE for some time and even
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be able to transmit it to other patients before a rectal screening culture would test positive.
The limitations posed by a lack of screening and an unknown time between exposure and
positive screening tests lead to the choice of a case-control study rather than a hazards or
survival analysis study to identify CRE risk factors. Healthcare exposure was stratified by
facility type rather than more detailed facility characteristics because the number of CRE
carriers at UCIMC was too small to power such analyses.
The emergence of CRE poses an increasing threat to public health given the large magni-
tude of healthcare exposure to CRE caused by inter-facility patient sharing of CRE carriers
and the high mortality rate among patients with CRE. Guided by a multi-level ecological
model of CRE emergence, these studies of patients admitted to one academic medical center
revealed that both the patient characteristics of comorbidity and length of stay and facil-
ity characteristics such as nursing home or hospital facility type are associated with CRE
carriage. These findings can both help to guide pragmatic recommendations by focusing
interventions on patients with high comorbidity and lengths of stay within hospital facilities
as well as to highlight key areas within the ecological model which could be further refined
through study of larger CRE carrier populations, for example by identifying key hospital
characteristics and patient comorbidities which are associated with CRE.
3.2 Aim 2: Evaluating the Extent to Which CRE Car-
riers Expose Other Healthcare Facilities in a Multi-
Center Study
The work under this Aim builds upon the work of Aim-1 by examining the epidemiology
of CRE across UC hospitals in the state in a larger dataset, not only to assess the gener-
alizability of the recommendation to focus containment interventions on patients with long
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lengths of hospital stay and high co-morbidity in both hospitals and nursing homes, as was
found in the prior study of patients from a single center, but also to expand and refine our
understanding of CRE risk beyond these general risk factors.
Efforts to understand the spread of CRE have been complicated by the fact that CRE is
difficult to measure. As discussed in section 2.4, CRE are not just one type of bacteria, but
instead are a group with at least five major species found in healthcare facilities. Additionally,
there are several genetic mechanisms that allow carbapenem resistance, so phenotypic testing
of bacterial cultures to demonstrate resistance to carbapenems in the hospital microbiology
laboratory is required. However, the interpretation of phenotypic tests depends on the
resistant breakpoints used, that is, how well the bacteria must grow in the presence of an
antibiotic before they are said to be resistant to that antibiotic. Because of these challenges
and the discovery of a novel carbapenem-resistance gene, OXA-48, which was present in
strains not detected by the CDC 2012 CRE definition, the CDC revised its CRE definition
in 2015.
In the second section of the chapter, the impact of changes in the surveillance definition
of CRE on public health response was examined. Revisiting the recommendations from
the previous chapter using a larger dataset was important to ensure that the risk factors
described in Aim 1 are true of CRE more generally, rather than anomalous factors that
are important among patients from one hospital. Using the larger, UC-wide dataset and
considering the impact of surveillance definitions, it was possible to refine the suggested
targets of intervention from prior work and more specifically direct limited resources toward
the particular settings and patients most at risk of CRE.
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3.2.1 State-wide Risk Factors for CRE
Rationale
To truly understand the spread of CRE throughout California, it was important to evaluate
whether exposure for patients with CRE from UCIMC are representative of those of CRE
patients state-wide. Thus, the study described in this section included the entire UC health-
care system. The seven UC hospitals participating in this study are all tertiary care facilities
in geographically separate portions of the state. Because of their geographic distance, the
facilities do not compete for patients with one another. Instead, each facility has its own
unique connections to regional healthcare facilities and reach within the state. Using the
exposure of CRE carriers from the entire UC system, I quantified the spread of CRE in and
out of multiple counties and facilities over time in order to highlight regional differences in
CRE burden.
Hypotheses
1. The prevalence of CRE carriage will be higher in Southern California than in Northern
California, but that per-person exposure days will be the same in both regions. As described
in the introduction, CRE first arrived in California in the Southern region, making it more
likely that CRE has spread further within this region.
2. CRE carriage will be strongly associated with future healthcare exposure days in this
multi-center study. Rationale for this hypothesis was similar to that in Aim 1.
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Materials and Method
Study Population The study population was all patients admitted to seven UC hospitals
in California between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013. The only patient exclusion
criterion was lack of a unique patient identifier in the California Hospital Discharge Database,
as described in the single-center UCI study in section 4.1.3 The seven hospitals were UCIMC;
Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center; UCLA Medical Center, Santa Monica; UCSF Medical
Center; UC Davis Medical Center; UC San Diego Thornton Hospital; and UC San Diego
Medical Center, Hillcrest Hospital. For each research question, the study design was the
same as those described in section 4.1.3 using patients from all seven of these hospitals
rather than only UCIMC.
Data Sources, Linking Methodology, Data Analyses, and Outcomes As in section
4.1, three data sets were linked in order to carry out the study. Two of these, the nursing
home (RESDAC) and hospital (OSHPD) databases, remained the same as described in
Aim 1. The third was limited line list data from all seven UC hospitals describing positive
microbiology laboratory cultures for CRE. Infection prevention departments at each UC (UC
Irvine, UC Los Angeles, UC San Francisco, UC Davis, and UC San Diego) submitted limited
line list data for positive CRE cultures for analysis.
Data from the seven sites throughout the UC system were collected under the UC Reliance
IRB system. The studies conducted under this aim were important both for their individual
knowledge-generating potential and because they were among the first studies to be con-
ducted under a new system, the UC Reliance Registry, which was begun to facilitate data
sharing between the UCs. This new system was designed to allow for the study of rare
diseases for which relatively few cases occur at each institution.
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Infection prevention departments at each UC hospital requested laboratory data for cultures
meeting a broad CRE definition which included all cultures that would fall under the 2015
CDC definition of CRE. Chart review was performed as necessary at each UC in order to
gather any demographic or admission data not reported in microbiology results. The follow-
ing data items were collected for each positive CRE microbiology test result: CRE and other
MDRO test dates and results, microbiologic data including date of culture, antimicrobial
sensitivity testing, plus the patients gender, birthdate, and admission and discharge dates
from each of these hospitalizations as the limited line item data, along with a study identifi-
cation number unique to the patient. Additional data sources and the linking methodology
used in this section were the same as those used in section 4.1.3.
The studies conducted in this aim for each research question used the same analysis methods
described in Aim 1. To evaluate the outcome of CRE exposure days and demographic
characteristics, I repeated the analyses for Aim 1, Question 1 using the larger group of
CRE carrier patients, who tested positive for CRE according to the 2015 CDC surveillance
definition, at all seven UC hospitals. To assess how CRE carriage impacts future healthcare
facility readmissions state-wide, I conducted a cohort study as described in Aim 1, Question
2 using patients from all seven UC hospitals in order.
Finally, I repeated the previous case-control regression analyses described in Aim 1, Ques-
tion 3, with this larger group in order to determine factors associated with CRE carriage
throughout the state in a manner similar to that in Orange County. Cases were defined as
patients with a positive CRE culture according to the CDC 2015 definition and at least one
inpatient admission at a UC hospital. Three date-matched controls were selected for each
case by choosing the three admissions immediately following the case admission at the same
hospital. Three comorbidity-matched controls were selected for each case and were patients
with admissions with the same total Elixhauser Comorbidity Index (7) and major diagnostic
category of the primary diagnosis as cases admitted to the same hospital.
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Results
CRE Epidemiology and Factors Associated with CRE Carriage The UC hospitals
together had 122,137 an average of admissions with unique patient identifiers per year during
the study period. Of the total UC patients with unique identifiers, 6% were children and 94%
were adults. 40.4% of the total admissions occurred in Northern California and the remainder
occurred in Southern California. Of the patients without unique identifiers (record linking
numbers), 51% were female, 62% were white, 45% were Hispanic, and 45% had private
insurance coverage. More than 50% of these patients without identifiers were less than 2
years old.
The number of CRE carrier patients at the seven UC hospitals between January 1, 2010 and
December 31, 2013 was 489. Of these, 62 patients did not have unique identifiers. These
patients without identifiers were 47% female, 63% white, and 29% Hispanic. Their mean age
was 26, with 40% under age 2 years. Of these admissions, 40% were insured by Medicaid
and 44% by private insurance coverage.
Among the 489 CRE carrier patients, 427 patients had valid unique identifier numbers in
the hospital admissions database. These patients were identified as cases for the case-control
studies. Comparative statistics are shown in Table 3.7 for factors at patient level among CRE
carriers along with their admission date-matched, non-CRE carrier controls (the subsequent
3 admissions) and comorbidity-matched, non-CRE carrier controls for comparison. As in
the single center study, compared to date-matched controls, cases had higher mean age and
number of comorbid conditions (Elixhauser). They were more likely to be black and less likely
to have private health insurance. Cases were more likely to have a primary diagnosis classified
as infectious, respiratory, or renal/urinary and to have undergone a surgical procedure,
especially those on the respiratory or cardiovascular systems.
Table 3.7: Characteristics of CRE Cases and Controls, California 2010-2013
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Characteristic CRE+
(%)
Date
Matched
Controls
(%)
Comorbidity
Matched
Controls
(%)
Age (mean (SD)) 61 (20) 53 (22) 64 (19)
Female gender 47% 48% 51%
Race
White 63% 71% 70%
Asian 8% 9% 9%
Black 16% 10% 11%
Other 12% 11% 12%
Hispanic ethnicity 19% 22 19%
Insurance type
Medicare 56% 40% 56%
Medicaid 19% 16% 16%
Private 20% 34% 21%
Indigent Programs 1% 3% 3%
Self Pay 1% 3% 2%
All Other 2% 4% 2%
Length of Stay (mean (sd)) 32 (43) 15 (25) 11 (20)
Primary diagnosis type
Infectious 24% 5% 24%
Respiratory 12% 7% 12%
Renal/Urinary 12% 6% 12%
Hepatobiliary 11% 7% 11%
Circulatory 9% 15% 9%
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Digestive 8% 10% 8%
Nervous 6% 11% 6%
Musculoskeletal 4% 7% 4%
Myeloproliferative 3% 6% 3%
Skin/Breast 2% 2% 2%
All Other 8% 25%* 8%
Surgery
Cardiovascular 16% 11% 9%
Digestive 12% 8% 8%
Respiratory 12% 3% 4%
Nervous 4% 3% 1%
Musculoskeletal 4% 3% 3%
Total Elixhauser Groups (mean
(sd))
4 (2) 3 (2) 4 (2)
Elixhauser Comorbidity Groups
Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders 46% 26% 42%
Cardiac Arrhythmia 37% 23% 30%
Hypertension Uncomplicated 31% 31% 37%
Renal Failure 25% 15% 26%
Weight Loss 25% 9% 14%
Diabetes Uncomplicated 25% 14% 23%
Other Neurological Disorders 23% 9% 15%
Liver Disease 22% 11% 17%
Hypertension Complicated 22% 12% 22%
Chronic Pulmonary Disease 20% 14% 27%
* Primarily pregnancy, mental disorders, and endocrine disorders.
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As in Aim-1, two case-control analyses were performed to identify potential CRE risk factors.
In the first case-control study, cases were compared to their admission date-matched con-
trols. Significant associations were found between a positive CRE carriage and the following
variables: age at admission, prior hospital and prior nursing home exposure (days of stay
in the respective health care facility type prior to index admission), length of stay in the
index admission, Elixhauser comorbidity score, CMS MDC, insurance type, and whether the
patient had a surgical procedure involving the musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular or
integumentary system using bivariate testing. Unlike in the single center study, time spent in
nursing homes prior to the index admission and insurance type were significantly associated
with CRE carriage.
Regression analyses from Aim-1 were repeated to test the multi-variable association of pa-
tient age at admission, length of index hospitalization, time spent in hospitals in the three
months prior to hospitalization, and cardiac and respiratory surgery with the outcome of
CRE carriage. As in Aim-1, these variables were all found to be significantly associated
with CRE carriage (p <0.001 for age, prior hospitalization, and surgeries, and p = 0.007 for
length of index admission).
Independent variables significantly associated with CRE carriage in bivariate testing using
the UC wide data were advanced to a multivariable logistic regression model, and the final
model showed that older age in decades (p <0.001), longer length of index admission per 10
days (p = 0.019), race (p= 0.011), cardiovascular surgery (p = 0.005), respiratory surgery
(p = 0.001), and days in hospitals (p = 0.001) and in nursing homes (p <0.001) in the 180
days prior to index admission were significantly associated with being a CRE carrier. While
the total comorbidity score was not significantly associated with being a CRE carrier, two
particular comorbidities, liver disease (p = 0.028) and neurological disorders (p = 0.004)
were.
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The second case-control study, in which cases were compared to controls matched on admit-
ting diagnosis and comorbidity score, examined the independent variables associated with
CRE carriage when cases to. Bivariate testing showed significant associations between CRE
carriage and the following variables: age at admission, race, prior hospital and nursing home
exposure, length of index admission, and whether the patient had surgery on the muscu-
loskeletal, integumentary, respiratory, or cardiovascular systems during the index admission.
These independent variables were advanced to the final analysis using a multivariable logistic
regression model, which showed that length of stay during the index admission, nursing home
and hospital exposures during the 180 days preceding index admission, and cardiovascular
and respiratory surgeries were significantly associated with being a CRE carrier (Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Risk Factors Associated with CRE Carriage
Characteristic Odds
Ratio
95% Con-
fidence
Limit P-
value
Length of index admission (per 10
days)
1.20 1.13 1.27 <0.001
Prior hospitalization (per 10 days) 1.14 1.10 1.18 <0.001
Prior nursing home visits (per 10
days)
1.05 1.01 1.08 0.009
Respiratory surgical procedures 1.62 1.17 2.25 0.004
Cardiovascular surgical procedures 1.78 1.36 2.31 <0.001
CRE Exposure due to Inter-facility Patient Sharing throughout California Among
the 427 case patients that had valid unique identifiers in the hospital discharge dataset, 148
(35%) died within 365 days of discharge from their index admission (versus 31% for the
previous single center study). Over the entire study period, there were 51,821 days of follow
up, which led to admissions at 90 hospitals, 113 nursing homes, and 20 LTACHs. Tracking
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the movement of these CRE carriers (cases) from the academic medical center to regional
healthcare facilities throughout California showed that cases spent 80 days in healthcare
facilities per 365 days of follow-up. The rate of case exposure to healthcare facilities in the
90, 180, and 365 days prior to and in the 180 and 365 days following positive CRE culture
was greater than that found in the single center study, while the rate of facility visits was
slightly lower for the 90 days immediately following the admission in which CRE carriage
was identified (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Extent of CRE Carrier Patient Exposure by Facility Type, Stratified by Timing
Relative to First CRE+ Culture
Prior to CRE
+
After CRE
+
181-
365d
91-
180d
90d 90d 91-
180d
181-
365d
Rate of facility visits (per
100 days of follow up)
0.38 0.56 2.25 1.68 0.52 0.32
Distinct healthcare facilities 156 141 212 133 93 107
Distinct hospitals 84 78 122 68 56 57
Distinct nursing homes 72 63 90 65 37 50
Healthcare facility visits 543 415 845 470 272 299
Hospital visits 408 308 667 341 195 205
Nursing home visits 135 107 178 129 77 94
Hospital LOS* (mean) 14.3 15.2 13.9 13.4 14.1 13.9
Hospital LOS (sd) 20.0 19.4 15.1 13.5 17.1 17.7
Nursing home LOS (mean) 30.2 25.2 20.6 17.9 25.3 33.3
Nursing home LOS (sd) 46.4 32.7 21.2 19.4 33.5 48.2
Hospital exposure days 19,771 14,844 9,253 4,584 7,576 10,286
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Nursing home exposure
days
12,684 7,194 3,662 2,306 5,209 9,976
Days of follow up** 143,386 73,881 37,473 27,929 52,568 92,831
*Length of Stay (LOS), raw exposure days, not accounting for patient deaths or loss to follow
up. **Limited by death in 148 patients.
Characteristics of cases were compared to those of inpatients in the full UC cohort. These
comparative statistics for factors at patient level among CRE carriers and the full cohort are
shown in Table 3.10. As in the single center study, compared to CRE UC cohort patients,
cases had significantly higher mean age, length of stay, and number of comorbid conditions
(Elixhauser). Cases were more likely to have a primary diagnosis classified as infectious,
respiratory, or renal/urinary and to have undergone a surgical procedure, particularly those
involving respiratory system. Compared to the single center study, a larger fraction of cases
in the UC-wide study were black, had diabetes, had cardiac arrhythmia, and had cardiovas-
cular surgery while fewer were Asian and had respiratory surgery.
Table 3.10: Characteristics of UC-wide Cohort Inpatients by CRE Status, 2010-2013
Characteristic CRE positive
(%)
CRE negative
(%)
Age (mean (SD)) 61 (20) 51 (22)
Female gender 47% 54%
Race
White 63% 70%
Asian 8% 9%
Black 16% 8%
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Other 12% 13%
Hispanic ethnicity 19% 26%
Insurance type
Medicare 56% 34%
Medicaid 19% 18%
Private 20% 37%
Indigent Programs 1% 6%
Self Pay 1% 3%
All Other 2% 3%
Length of Stay (mean (sd)) 32 (43) 5 (10)
Primary diagnosis type
Infectious 24% 4%
Respiratory 12% 6%
Renal/Urinary 12% 6%
Hepatobiliary 11% 4%
Circulatory 9% 11%
Digestive 8% 9%
Nervous 6% 11%
Musculoskeletal 4% 12%
Myeloproliferative 3% 2%
Skin/Breast 2% 3%
All Other 8% 32%*
Surgery
Cardiovascular 16% 8%
Digestive 12% 6%
Respiratory 12% 2%
Nervous 4% 4%
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Musculoskeletal 4% 5%
Total Elixhauser Groups (mean (sd)) 4 (2) 2 (2)
Elixhauser Comorbidity Groups
Fluid and Electrolyte Disorders 46% 16%
Cardiac Arrhythmia 37% 15%
Hypertension Uncomplicated 31% 30%
Renal Failure 25% 9%
Weight Loss 25% 4%
Diabetes Uncomplicated 25% 13%
Other Neurological Disorders 23% 8%
Liver Disease 22% 7%
Hypertension Complicated 22% 8%
Chronic Pulmonary Disease 20% 14%
*Primarily pregnancy, endocrine and mental disorders
The healthcare facility exposure of the CRE cases and cohort were also compared. The
fraction of time spent in healthcare facilities is shown in Figure 3.2 for both cases and the
full UC cohort. The fraction of time spent in healthcare facilities by cases was approximately
five times that of the cohort prior to the index admission and nine times that of the cohort
following the index admission. While the UC-wide cohort spent a similar fraction of days in
healthcare facilities following index admission as the UCI cohort, among cases, the fraction
was much higher, peaking at 43% versus 20% for UCI cases during the first 90 days following
discharge from the index admission.
Factors Associated with Healthcare Facility Exposure A cohort study was con-
ducted in order to assess whether the burden of healthcare exposure of CRE patients follow
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Figure 3.2: Fraction of Days Spent in Healthcare Facilities Relative to Index Admission
index admission remained significantly higher than that of the cohort when controlling for
other factors. For dichotomous variables, patients with prior positive CRE culture, male gen-
der (the opposite finding from the single center study), non-Hispanic ethnicity, respiratory
surgery, or cardiovascular surgery (all p <0.001) spent significantly more time in healthcare
facilities following index admission. For categorical variables, days spent in healthcare fa-
cilities following index admission differed significantly with race, insurance type, and major
diagnostic category of the patients primary diagnosis at the index admission (all p <0.001).
For continuous variables, higher patient age at index admission, higher total Elixhauser Co-
morbidity Index, longer length of index admission, and more time spent in both hospitals
and nursing homes prior to the index admission were associated with a greater length of
time spent in healthcare facilities following index admission (all p <0.001). Table 3.11 shows
the results of the same regression as performed in the single-center study. The direction and
significance of the effects were the same for all independent variables; however, the magni-
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tude of the effect was greater for CRE carriage and nursing home stay in the prior year and
smaller for hospital stay in the prior year and length of index admission.
Table 3.11: UC-wide Patient and Prior Facility Characteristics Associated with Rate of
Healthcare Facility Days per day of Follow Up, for Comparison to Single Center
Characteristic Model Estimate* P-value
CRE Carriage 0.67 <0.001
Hospital Visit 1 Year Prior 0.16 <0.001
Nursing Home Stay 1 Year Prior 0.98 <0.001
Age (per 10 year) 0.17 <0.001
Elixhauser Comorbidity Index 0.10 <0.001
Length of Index Admission (per 10
days)
0.07 <0.001
*For example, for each 10-year increase in patient age, the patients rate of healthcare visits
(days in healthcare facilities per day of follow-up time after index admission) would increase
by a factor of 1.19 (i.e., e0.17).
The final multivariable regression model showed that number of follow up days in healthcare
facilities post-discharge was significantly associated with prior CRE carriage, age at admis-
sion, prior healthcare exposure in hospitals and in nursing homes, length of index admission,
and comorbidities (Table 3.12).
Table 3.12: Patient and Prior Facility Characteristics Associated with Rate of Healthcare
Facility Days per day of Follow Up
Characteristic Model Estimate* P-value
CRE carriage (prior positive CRE clin-
ical culture)
0.63 <0.001
Hospital Visit 1 Year Prior 0.14 <0.001
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Nursing Home Visit 1 Year Prior 0.98 <0.001
Age (per 10 years) 0.16 <0.001
Elixhauser Comorbidity Score 0.08 <0.001
Length of Index Admission (per 10
days)
0.07 <0.001
Respiratory Surgery 0.16 <0.001
Cardiovascular Surgery 0.11 <0.001
Insurance Type (self-pay as reference) <0.001
Medicare 0.14
Medicaid 0.23
Private -0.14
Indigent 0.11
All Other -0.06
Female -0.16 <0.001
Hispanic -0.06 <0.001
Race (white as reference) <0.001
Asian -0.07
Black 0.19
Other -0.01
*For example, for each 10-year increase in patient age, the patients rate of healthcare visits
(days in healthcare facilities per day of follow-up time after index admission) would increase
by a factor of 1.17 (i.e., e0.16).
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Discussion
Together, Aim 1 and Aim 2.1 demonstrate the spread of CRE across California and the rapid-
ity of exposure of healthcare facilities, and patients within them, to CRE carriers. However,
the result described in this section showed that CRE carriage (as measured by positive
clinical culture) in the Northern California hospitals was far lower than that in Southern
California hospitals. Northern California UC hospitals had only 21 cases per 100,000 pa-
tients whereas Southern California UC hospitals had 217 cases per 100,000 patients. This
discrepancy demonstrates that CRE is still emerging in California, with the bulk of spread
occurring in Southern California. Containment efforts focused on Southern California could
help prevent the spread of CRE throughout the state.
Results from Aim 2.1 provide further evidence of the high burden of CRE infectious spread
on the healthcare system. A 35% overall mortality rate was observed among CRE cases in
the UC Hospitals, compared to 31% in the single center study. Healthcare facility exposure
to CRE also remained high. Despite the fact that many more cases than controls died in
the year following admission, resulting in shorter follow up periods for cases, cases spent 1.8
times as many days in healthcare facilities following index admission than controls (compared
to more than three times in the single-center study), and CRE carriage was associated
with this increased healthcare facility exposure even when controlling for primary diagnosis,
comorbidity, and other factors. In total, the 427 CRE cases produced nearly 20,000 days
of healthcare facility CRE exposure in the year following their index admission, despite the
deaths of 35% of the cases.
In addition to providing further evidence that CRE remains in an emerging phase, in which
it could be potentially contained, and motivating of containment efforts by reiterating the
consequences of inaction on CRE and emergence, results of this aim suggest targets for the
public health action. As in the single center study, about half of the facility exposure days
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found in this study were in nursing homes, reenforcing the importance of their inclusion in
containment efforts. In addition to the risk factors for CRE identified in the single-center
study, this larger study was able to identify nursing home exposures during the 180 days
preceding index admission as a risk factor, underlining the importance of nursing homes
in preventing the spread of CRE. Furthermore, the study was able to provide results that
can refine the previous recommendation that interventions focus on patients with high co-
morbidity to specifically highlight patients who have received cardiovascular and respiratory
surgeries.
This study had several limitations. First, policies for performing clinical cultures, culture
techniques, and microbiology database search methods differed among the UCs under study.
However, use of a consistent case definition and data collection instructions should have
minimized these disparities as much as possible for these analyses. This study also possesses
the same limitations posed by a lack of screening and an unknown time between exposure
and positive screening tests as in Aim 1.
This study quantifies the threat posed by the emergence of CRE, both in terms of mortality
and exposure to healthcare facilities. However, it also provides evidence that CRE is still
emerging and could potentially be contained if action were taken. The multi-level ecological
model of CRE emergence was able to guide more detailed analysis of CRE risk factors
using the larger, state-wide dataset. These findings can help to further refine the pragmatic
recommendations given by Aim 1, by focusing on patients with high comorbidity, particularly
those who have received respiratory and cardiovascular surgery, with long lengths of stay in
hospitals and nursing homes.
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3.2.2 Impact of Changing CRE Surveillance Definitions
Introduction
In this section, the impact of surveillance definition choice on the epidemiology of CRE will
be examined. The epidemiologist Mervyn Susser is credited with distinguishing between
illness, the patients subjective experience; sickness, the cultural and societal implications;
and disease, the pathobiology (167). CDC definitions of CRE can be thought of as defining
CRE as both a disease and a sickness because they define the disease of CRE as the presence
of certain species of bacteria possessing certain antibiotic susceptibilities but also give a
distinct cultural meaning (e.g. through use of the term nightmare bacteria (168)) to the
sickness of CRE as the carriage of these bacteria versus those just slightly below the resistance
cutoff. The CDCs definitions of CRE disease and sickness play a major role in eliciting public
health response and interventions toward CRE bacteria while deprioritizing other, similar
bacteria.
Unlike recognized strains of CRE, other Enterobacteriaceae not recognized as CRE at the
time of laboratory microbiology culture do not typically trigger an order placing the patient
in contact precautions. As a result, healthcare workers are more likely to carry these strains
to other patients on their bodies or clothing even after the microbiology report is finalized.
Therefore, these strains may spread faster than strains which are recognized and contained
using contact precautions.
The CDC released an initial, narrower definition of CRE in 2012 (169) and then subsequently
broadened this definition by releasing a less restrictive surveillance definition in 2015 to
ensure detection of the OXA-48 strain of CRE (170). Tension exists between these two
definitions because some infectious disease physicians believe that the 2012 definition allows
exposures to go unnoticed, allowing the outbreak to escalate, while others believe that a
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broader definition increases attention to the problem, but may divert limited resources from
the most important cases.
Although it was only added to the CDC CRE definition in 2015, the OXA-48 strain of CRE
was first identified in Turkey in 2001 (171) and by 2010 had spread to France and Belgium
where it caused healthcare associated outbreaks (172; 173; 174). Thus, by the time the CDCs
initial CRE definition was written in 2012, OXA-48 was known to be spreading throughout
Europe, presaging its spread to the United States, and its pattern of antimicrobial sensitivity
was known. Thus, it could have been included in the definition. The first cases of OXA-
48 CRE were reported in the United States in 2012 (175), shortly after the CDCs initial
CRE definition was released. However, because these strains were excluded from the 2012
definition due to the requirement for resistance to all third generation cephalosporins, they
were able to spread unchecked until 2015. Still, the expanded 2015 definition represents a
tradeoff since it may allow some false positives and divert resources away from the most
critical CRE strains. The studies described in this section aimed to quantify the impact of
CDCs changing definitions of CRE.
Hypotheses
1. CRE carriage prevalence will be greater using the CDC 2015 definition. This hypothesis
was based on the fact that the 2015 definition was designed to capture OXA-48, an additional
strain of CRE.
2. CRE cases identified using the 2015 definition will have lower Elixhauser comorbidity
scores (i.e. be healthier) than those detected using the 2012 definition. This hypothesis
was based on the 2015 definition being a broader definition of CRE, potentially allowing the
identification of CRE patients who were less severely affected.
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3. Bacteria defined as CRE by the CDC 2015 definition, but not initially recognized as CRE
under the 2012 definition, will have a faster increase in detection rate over the study period
than CRE recognized under the 2012 definition. This was proposed because it was thought
that failure of early identification of CRE strains would lead to greater spread.
Materials and Methods
The study population, data sources, and linking methodology used were the same as those
described in section 5.1. After receipt of the data sets describing positive cultures from all
seven UC hospitals, the cases were classified by each of the two definitions. The 2012 CDC
interim definition of CRE described CRE as Enterobacteriaceae that are non-susceptible to
one of the following carbapenems: doripenem, meropenem, or imipenem and resistant to all
of the following third-generation cephalosporins that were tested: ceftriaxone, cefotaxime,
and ceftazidime (176). The 2015 CDC surveillance definition of CRE is Any Escherichia
coli, Klebsiella oxytoca, Klebsiella pneumoniae, or Enterobacter spp. testing resistant to
imipenem, meropenem, doripenem, or ertapenem by standard susceptibility testing methods
(177).
Data Analyses
CRE Prevalence by Surveillance Definition First, the number of CRE carriers testing
positive for CRE according to the two definitions will be calculated. The overlap of two
groups of patients testing positive for CRE according to the 2012 and 2015 definitions was
evaluated. Exposures and demographic characteristics of patients testing positive according
to the two definitions were measured using descriptive statistics.
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CRE Epidemiology by Surveillance Definition Patient characteristics among carriers
of CRE according to the two definitions were described, including demographics, insurance
status, diagnostic and procedure codes, length of stay, and recent and subsequent healthcare
exposure. Using ANOVA and chi squared tests as appropriate, the exposures and demo-
graphic characteristics of the patients defined as having CRE according to two definitions
were compared. I will compare the CRE exposures under these two definitions in terms of
days of exposure at each type of facility before and after CRE diagnosis and the number
of affected counties. Finally, I will repeat the previous case-control regression analyses de-
scribed in Aim 1 with the two additional definitions in order to determine whether prior
healthcare facility exposure is more closely associated with some definitions, or types, of
CRE.
Rate of CRE Spread by Surveillance Definition To evaluate potential differential
spread of CRE strains qualifying under the two different definitions, the incidence of posi-
tive CRE cultures according to each definition was compared among all hospital patients.
Changes in the incidence of positive cultures according to each definition were examined over
time for trends within the definition groups and these changes were compared between the
two definitions.
Results
CRE Prevalence by Surveillance Definition The number of CRE carriers was 427
according to the 2015 definition and 303 according to the 2012 definition. Of these, 271
cases were classified as CRE by both definitions, 156 by the 2015 definition only, and 32 by
the 2012 definition only. Healthcare facility exposures of patients testing positive according
to the two definitions are shown in Figure 3.3. Cases classified as CRE according to the
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Figure 3.3: Rate of Healthcare Facility Visits for CRE+ Cases by 2012 and 2015 CDC
Definitions
2012 definition spent a greater fraction of their time both prior to and following the index
admission in healthcare facilities than those classified as CRE by the 2015 definition.
CRE Epidemiology by Surveillance Definition A comparison of patient characteris-
tics among carriers of CRE according to the two definitions is shown in Table 3.13. Patients
in the two groups did not differ significantly in the categories measured, including demo-
graphics, insurance status, diagnostic and procedure codes, and length of stay. However,
when comparing comorbidities, the rate of neurological comorbidities was higher in the 2012
definition group (p = 0.02).
Table 3.13: Characteristics of UC-wide CRE Cases by CDC definition, 2010-2013
Characteristic 2015 Definition (%) 2012 Definition (%)
Age (mean (SD)) 61 (20) 62 (20)
Female gender 47% 46%
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Race
White 63% 64%
Asian 8% 8%
Black 16% 16%
Other 12% 11%
Hispanic ethnicity 19% 18%
Insurance type
Medicare 56% 58%
Medicaid 19% 20%
Private 20% 19%
Indigent Programs 1% 1%
Self Pay 1% 1%
All Other 2% 1%
Length of Stay (mean (sd)) 32 (43) 35 (46)
Primary diagnosis type
Infectious 24% 29%
Respiratory 12% 13%
Renal/Urinary 12% 9%
Hepatobiliary 11% 10%
Circulatory 9% 9%
Digestive 8% 9%
Nervous 6% 5%
Musculoskeletal 4% 4%
Myeloproliferative 3% 4%
Skin/Breast 2% 2%
All Other 8% 6%
Surgery
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Cardiovascular 16% 15%
Digestive 12% 15%
Respiratory 12% 14%
Nervous 4% 3%
Musculoskeletal 4% 3%
Total Elixhauser Groups
(mean (sd))
4 (2) 4 (2)
Elixhauser Comorbidity
Groups
Fluid and Electrolyte Disor-
ders
46% 49%
Cardiac Arrhythmia 37% 39%
Hypertension Uncompli-
cated
31% 28%
Renal Failure 25% 26%
Weight Loss 25% 30%
Diabetes Uncomplicated 25% 28%
Other Neurological Disor-
ders
23% 31%
Liver Disease 22% 20%
Hypertension Complicated 22% 24%
Chronic Pulmonary Disease 20% 20%
CRE exposures under the 2012 definition are shown in Table 3.14 (for comparison to the
2015 definition group see Table 3.9). Patients with CRE classified by the 2012 definition had
a greater rate of facilities visits both before and after the index visit in which they were first
identified as CRE carriers, compared to the 2015 definition group.
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Table 3.14: Extent of 2012 CDC Definition CRE Carrier Patient Exposure by Facility Type,
Stratified by Timing Relative to First CRE+ Culture (Compare to Table 3.9 for 2015)
Prior to CRE
+
After CRE
+
181-
365d
91-
180d
90d 90d 91-
180d
181-
365d
Rate of facility visits (per 100
days of follow up)
0.58 0.83 3.09 2.37 0.75 0.46
Distinct healthcare facilities 218 180 234 164 123 131
Distinct hospitals 78 74 102 56 53 50
Distinct nursing homes 140 106 132 108 70 81
Healthcare facility visits 581 430 809 451 271 289
Hospital visits 346 247 543 247 149 156
Nursing home visits 235 183 266 204 122 133
Hospital LOS* (mean) 15.37 16.69 14.93 13.81 14.84 14.65
Hospital LOS (sd) 21.72 21.21 16.03 15.00 18.61 18.82
Nursing home LOS (mean) 26.58 21.06 16.52 19.04 24.84 32.37
Nursing home LOS (sd) 42.67 27.93 17.81 19.31 29.73 41.94
Hospital exposure days 17455 13182 8105 3411 5878 8088
Nursing home exposure days 18177 9455 4394 3884 8097 14859
Days of follow up** 99612 51638 26206 19045 36016 63149
*Length of Stay (LOS), in raw exposure days, not accounting for patient deaths or loss to
follow up **Limited by death in 125/303 patients.
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In a study comparing CRE carriers according to the 2012 CDC definition to their date-
matched controls, age, prior stay in hospitals and nursing homes, respiratory and cardio-
vascular surgery, the patients primary diagnosis, and comorbid neurological disorders were
significantly associated with CRE carriage (Table 3.15). Unlike a similar study using the
2015 CDC CRE definition, this study did not find the length of the index admission, the
patients race, or comorbid liver disease to be significantly associated with CRE carriage.
The odds ratios for prior nursing home exposure days, respiratory surgery, digestive and
hepatobiliary primary diagnoses, and comorbid neurological disorders in this 2012 definition
study were above the 95% confidence intervals found in the 2015 definition study.
Table 3.15: Comparison between Factors Associated with CRE Carriage According to the
2012 and 2015 CRE Definitions
Characteristic Odds
Ratio
95%
Confi-
dence
Limit P-
value
Patient Age (per decade) 1.127 1.035 1.227 0.0058
Length of Index Admission (per 10
days)
1.009 0.964 1.055 0.7016
Prior Hospitalization Days (per 10
days)
1.209 1.152 1.269 <.0001
Prior Nursing Home Days (per 10 days) 1.16 1.103 1.22 <.0001
Respiratory Surgery 3.502 2.266 5.41 <.0001
Cardiovascular Surgery 1.849 1.247 2.743 0.0022
Race (White as reference) 0.5662
Asian 0.878 0.475 1.623 0.3595
Black 1.189 0.701 2.017 0.6929
Other 1.372 0.816 2.305 0.2796
89
Major Diagnostic Category (Nervous
System as Reference)
<.0001
Circulatory 1.18 0.519 2.681 0.0101
Digestive 3.538 1.504 8.322 0.0918
Hepatobiliary 2.838 1.119 7.196 0.4661
Infectious 7.293 3.244 16.397 <.0001
Musculoskeletal 2.054 0.735 5.738 0.7939
Myeloproliferative 1.232 0.455 3.331 0.0926
Pregnancy 0.972 0.135 6.975 0.3324
Renal/Urinary 7.779 3.204 18.888 <.0001
Respiratory 2.718 1.17 6.317 0.5028
Skin/Breast 2.29 0.628 8.355 0.9839
Other 1.784 0.768 4.142 0.3607
Liver Disease 1.471 0.885 2.447 0.1366
Neurological Disorders 3.272 2.087 5.13 <.0001
Rate of CRE Spread by Surveillance Definition To evaluate potential differential
spread of CRE strains qualifying under the two different definitions, the incidence of posi-
tive CRE cultures according to each definition was compared among all hospital patients.
Examination of the changes in the incidence of positive cultures according to each definition
showed similar trends for the two groups, likely owing to the large overlap of cases meeting
both definitions (Figure 3.4).
*2015 group includes cultures which only qualify as CRE by the 2015 definition (i.e. they do
not qualify under the 2012 definition). 2012-Inclusive group includes cultures which qualify
under the 2012 CDC CRE definition regardless of whether they also qualify under the 2015
definition.
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Figure 3.4: Positive CRE Cultures by Definition, California 2010-2013*
Discussion
Surveillance definitions impact the ability of healthcare facilities and public health systems
to track and prevent the spread of dangerous pathogens. This comparison of the 2012 and
2015 CDC definitions of CRE found that the number of CRE carriers identified differed
between the two definitions. Use of the 2012 definition of CRE resulted in failure to identify
37% of carriers identified by the 2015 definition, while use of the new 2015 definition excludes
11% of the carriers identified by the 2012 definition.
The rate of healthcare facility exposure from these carriers (in patient-days of exposure per
day of follow-up) also differed between the 2012 and 2015 CRE definitions. Compared to
rates of facility exposure to CRE by the 2012 definition, exposure by the 2015 definition was
slightly lower in the 90, 180, and 365 days following the admission in which carriers were
first identified. Thus, use of the more restrictive 2012 definition resulted in decreased identi-
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fication of CRE carriers as compared to the 2015 definition, and this failure to identify 2015
definition CRE cases resulted in a rate of healthcare facility exposure following identification
of the CRE carrier status that was much higher than control patients, although it was lower
than that of 2012 definition cases. As a result, opportunities for intervention, such as use of
contact precautions, were missed when the restrictive surveillance definition was used.
Given that the 2012 definition missed over a third of cases identified by the 2015 definition
and the higher healthcare facility exposure of the missed cases, I anticipated that this failure
to recognize CRE carriers would result in greater spread of the 2015 definition strains which
were not identified by the 2012 definition. However, I found that strains meeting the 2015
definition, but undetected under the 2012 definition, did not appear to spread at a faster
rate based on the rate of incidence of cultures newly positive for these strains over time. Nor
did the undetected strains result in worse illness, as measured by greater hospital lengths of
stay, due to this failure of detection.
Despite the fact that CRE strains with resistance caused by the OXA-48 gene had already
been identified as causative in European outbreaks in 2010, the CDC did not incorporate
this strains known sensitivity patterns when creating the 2012 surveillance definition for
CRE. By highlighting differences in the rise of CRE strains included and excluded from the
2012 definition and showing the large number of additional CRE carriers only detected using
the 2015 definition, this study demonstrated the results of failure to consider MDRO trends
abroad when creating surveillance definitions for MDROs in the United States. A more
proactive approach is needed when establishing MDRO surveillance definitions, analyzing
MDRO trends abroad for clues to future MDRO spread in the United States.
92
3.3 Aim 3: Co-colonization of CRE Carriers with Other
MDROs and Implications for CRE Containment
via Contact Precautions Policies
3.3.1 Introduction
The studies under this aim sought to evaluate how the co-colonization of CRE carriers
affects the potential efficacy of contact precautions policies in preventing the spread of CRE
through three steps: first, assessing the rate of co-colonization of patients with CRE and
other MDROs then comparing the length of time from admission to precautions for CRE
patients based on their co-colonization status and timing of co-colonization to determine
whether precautions policies for endemic MDROs can help prevent the spread of CRE. In
this aim I examined how the interaction of institutional level infection control policies with
intrapersonal level patient factors can be leveraged to limit the spread of CRE.
Because CRE is an infectious agent, institutional level policies are necessary to address
safety beyond the individual CRE carriers. I focused on the potential efficacy of one in-
stitutional policy intervention, contact precautions, to help contain CRE among the high
risk patients, those with high comorbidity and prior healthcare facility exposure, in light of
the intrapersonal, patient level characteristic of co-colonization, i.e. the situation in which
patients are carriers of one or more other pathogens in addition to CRE. The importance of
organizational policies such as these in understanding a patients ecological environment was
highlighted by Bronfenbrenner as part of his mesosystem level of ecological systems theory
(88). In applying McLeroy and colleagues model of the multiple levels of influence over
health concerns to CRE, these policies constitute the institutional factors impacting CRE
emergence and spread (90).
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Institutional or organization-level influences are crucial to human health and interventions
at this level have been used successfully in a wide range of areas including childrens mental
health treatment (178), HIV prevention (179), and work site health-promotion programs
(180). For example, in the area of childrens mental health, an institutional level intervention
to implement an evidence-based therapy program for delinquent youth in rural Appalachia
showed improved outcomes over neighboring counties without such interventions (178). In
another domain, a review of worksite nutrition and physical activity promotion programs
found that these programs successfully achieved the goals of decreased employee weight
and BMI in randomized control trials (181). Institutional-level interventions have also been
successful in the domain of infection control, in which healthcare worker influenza vaccination
programs have also been successful in reducing patient mortality and influenza (182).
The goal of studying the institutional and intrapersonal level risk factors for CRE and
for healthcare facility exposure to CRE is to identify ways to interrupt the spread of this
dangerous pathogen and prevent it from becoming endemic in California. An institutional
level policy commonly used by hospitals to prevent the spread of multi-drug resistant HAIs
is the use of contact precautions (183). Contact precautions involves placing a patient in a
single room, if available, and requiring that healthcare personnel who enter the patients room
clean their hands and don a gown and gloves for all in-room activity, followed by removal
and re-cleaning of hands. Contact precautions are commonly used for patients known to
harbor MRSA, VRE, ESBL, and multiple drug-resistant gram negative rods (MDR GNR)
in order to prevent the spread of these organisms to other patients (183).
Thus, one way to prevent CRE from taking root in California may be for hospitals and
nursing homes to implement institutional-level contact precautions policies for CRE. Such
policies have established efficacy in controlling the spread of other MDROs. Implementation
of contact precautions policies for MRSA has been shown to stop MRSA outbreaks (184) and
decrease the rate of healthcare-associated MRSA infection (185; 186). Contact precautions
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policies were also a component of the Israeli intervention to control CRE, as described in
the introduction, suggesting that they may offer benefit for CRE specifically (66). In fact,
in a recent survey of Orange County hospitals, the use of contact precautions appears to be
the singular common response to CRE if a case becomes known to the hospital, contact
precautions are instituted.
Several additional steps are required for contact precautions to be effective. First, there must
be good communication between healthcare facilities. Next, proper attention must be given
to culturing to determine the cause of infections. Finally, facilities must determine whether
they will perform screening to accelerate contact precautions, an unlikely prospect given
the costs and low prevalence of CRE. Unfortunately, even if facilities were to implement
CRE screening, significant lags between collection of clinical cultures and laboratory report
finalization would delay the application of contact precautions. First a submitted specimen
is incubated for growth (1-5 days), then the organism is set up for susceptibility testing
(1-2 days), and, finally, CRE confirmation steps require another day. In total, the time
from culture collection to the knowledge that it harbors CRE could be a week or longer,
time during which the patient is not in contact precautions. Thus, the study described in
this chapter aimed to understand the extent to which contact precautions could limit the
spread of CRE by quantifying patient-days of healthcare facility exposure to CRE carriers
which could have been prevented had contact precautions been implemented immediately
upon receipt of laboratory results confirming a patient’s carriage of CRE and by contact
precautions policies for endemic MDROs.
As an emerging MDRO, CRE currently has a low prevalence in California. Without knowl-
edge of healthcare utilization patterns in the United States, one might conclude that the
impact of contact precautions for CRE might be correspondingly small. However, as shown
in Aims 1 and 2, patients harboring CRE are high utilizers of healthcare, with significantly
higher rates of healthcare exposure prior to and following identification of the patients CRE
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carrier status compared to the exposure of other hospital inpatients. In 2013, the top 1%
of healthcare utilizers in the United States accounted for 21.5 percent of the healthcare ex-
penditures (the top 5% account for roughly half of the expenditures), while the bottom 50%
of healthcare utilizers accounted for only 2.7% of expenditures (111). Analyses of hospital
inpatient stay days have shown trends similar to those for healthcare expenditures, meaning
that a very small percentage of the population accounts for the majority of hospital inpa-
tient days (112). These high utilizers are of great interest to insurers, including Medicare
and Medicaid, for financial reasons, but also to public health because of their ability to ex-
pose large numbers of other patients to healthcare associated infections. Given these general
known healthcare utilization patterns in the U.S. and the results of Aims 1 and 2, the risk of
CRE exposure to others from the small group of CRE carrier patients is disproportionately
large. However, the small number of CRE carriers also means that contact precautions poli-
cies for CRE could have a large infection prevention impact despite affecting relatively few
patients and thus requiring few resources.
Given that the risk factors, such as high exposure to healthcare facilities, are similar for
the endemic MDROs which have been studied to date, patients with these risk factors can
become co-colonized with multiple MDROs, including CRE. Co-colonization has been shown
to be common among carriers of the most prevalent MDROs. A study of VRE co-colonization
found that 36% of VRE carriers had MRSA and 15% had Clostridium difficile (187). Other
studies have found the rate of MRSA co-colonization among VRE carriers to be 23-26% (188;
189). Among carriers of ESBL-producing bacteria, of which most CRE are a subset, 47%
have been found to colonized with VRE (190). A previous study of co-colonization among
CRE carriers found that 40% were also colonized with carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter
baumannii or Pseudomonas aeruginosa (191). Therefore, patients newly identified as CRE
carriers already may have been known to carry other MDROs and, as a result, already be
on contact precautions prior to identification of their CRE status, preventing seven or more
days of CRE exposure.
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If most patients testing positive for CRE have not already been diagnosed with other MDROs
and therefore are not on contact precautions, CRE precautions could be of great benefit.
However, if many CRE carriers are already known to carry an endemic MDRO prior to labo-
ratory results revealing their CRE carrier status, then precautions policies for those endemic
MDROs could further limit the spread of CRE by placing CRE carriers into precautions
before their CRE status is even known.
Given that some healthcare systems are beginning to discontinue the use of contact precau-
tions for endemic MDROs with high prevalence (192; 193), it is important to understand
the unintended impacts these policy changes may have on the spread of emerging MDROs.
This aim will provide information on both co-colonization rates of CRE with other MDROs,
the extent to which instutional contact precautions policies for CRE carriers could reduce
healthcare facility exposure to CRE, and the frequency with which CRE carriers are placed
in contact precautions for carriage of other MDROs prior to microbiology reports confirming
their CRE status.
3.3.2 Hypotheses
1. A high proportion of CRE carriers will be known to also be carriers of MDROs compared
to patients with similar levels of comorbidity. This was proposed because the risk factors for
MDROs are similar across many groups of organisms and prior studies have shown substantial
co-colonization of patients with other groups of MDROs.
2. CRE-specific contact precautions policies would result in significantly lower patient-days
of CRE exposure to healthcare facilities. This hypothesis is based on prior studies of contact
precautions for other MDROs.
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3. CRE carriers who have co-colonization with at least one other MDRO will have a shorter
time from admission to precautions than those who are not co-colonized. This hypothesis is
based on both co-colonization rates and effect of contact precautions in prior studies.
3.3.3 Materials and Methods
Study Population
The study population was all patients testing positive for CRE by the 2015 CDC definition
at UC Irvine Medical Center (UCIMC) between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013
who also had an inpatient visit at UCIMC during the study period. While the positive CRE
culture may have been taken during an inpatient or outpatient visit, the patient must have
had at least one inpatient visit so that the time to precautions could be assessed. Because
this study was intended to describe co-colonization of all CRE carrier patients admitted to
UCIMC between 2010-2013, no exclusions were used other than the requirement for a unique
identifier in the hospital admissions database, as described in Aim 1. The age and gender
distribution reflected the distribution across CRE carrier patients at UCIMC without bias.
When CRE carriers were compared to controls, three comorbidity-matched controls for each
case were selected from among UCI inpatients hospitalized during the study period to match
cases on total Elixhauser Comorbidity Index and major diagnostic category of the primary
diagnosis, as described in Aim 1.
Data Sources
Data on CRE positive patients were obtained from the UCIMC limited line list data set
described in Aim 1. Data regarding whether the patient had tested positive for other MDROs
(MRSA, VRE, ESBL, MDR GNR, C. difficile) and the date of the first positive test were
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included for each CRE positive patient. These co-colonization data for CRE carriers were
obtained from the Infection Prevention Program at UCIMC, which provided detailed records
of positive MDRO microbiology reports and the dates on which contact precautions were
ordered for CRE carrier patients.
For the comparison of MDRO carriage among CRE carriers and controls, information re-
garding MRSA colonization for cases and their comorbidity-matched controls was obtained
from line item hospitalization data obtained from the California Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development, referred to as the hospitalization dataset.
3.3.4 Data Analyses
MDRO Co-colonization among CRE Carriers
I identified the rate of co-colonization of CRE carriers with other MDROs using data provided
by UCIMC Infection Prevention in the UCIMC limited data set. These data contained
information about each patients other MDRO diagnoses and date of the first positive cultures
resulting in these diagnoses for MRSA, VRE, ESBL, MDR GNR, and C. difficile. I compared
the prevalence of co-colonization among the MDROs within the CRE carrier patient group.
Comparing MDRO Carriage among CRE Carriers and Controls
I then compared the rate of MRSA co-colonization of the CRE carrier cases with the rate
of MRSA co-colonization for their comorbidity-matched controls (described in Aim 1) as
reported in the hospital admissions database. I chose MRSA as the MDRO for comparison
in this study because it is the dominant superbug in healthcare settings, representing the
majority of healthcare associated MDROs. Additionally, it is the organism which is most ac-
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curately and representatively captured in administrative data due to Californias mandatory
MRSA screening laws.
A patient was classified as having MRSA if they had a diagnosis code field which contained
one or more of the following ICD9 codes: 038.12 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
septicemia, 041.12 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in conditions classified else-
where and of unspecified site, 482.42 Methicillin-resistant pneumonia due to Staphylococcus
aureus, V02.54 Carrier or suspected carrier of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus,
or V12.04 Personal history of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus. To ensure fair
comparison between the cases and controls, I counted a CRE case as being co-colonized with
MRSA only if this information was recorded in the hospital admissions database without
including any additional cases with MRSA available in the clinical data from Infection Pre-
vention because only the administrative hospital admissions data were available for controls.
Impact of CRE Precautions Policies in Limiting CRE Exposure
I determined the number of inpatient days of CRE exposure which could have been prevented
by the implementation of a CRE contact precautions policy by calculating the difference
between the date on which each CRE carrier’s first positive CRE culture report was finalized
and their discharge from hospitalization. I stratified the CRE exposure days by those that
could only have been prevented by the implementation of a CRE contact precautions policy
and those which also could have been prevented by contact precautions policies for other,
endemic MDROs (MRSA, VRE, ESBL, MDR GNR, and C. difficile). The lag time between
CRE culture collection and finalization of the microbiology culture report was also calculated
for each CRE carrier.
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Additional Benefit of Endemic MDRO Precautions Policies on Time to Precau-
tions and CRE Exposure
For each CRE carrier patient, I used the dates of the first positive MDRO culture for each of
the patients MDRO diagnoses in order to determine whether and when carrier patients tested
positive for other MDROs. In order to determine whether the co-colonized patients were
placed on precautions as a result of carrying other MDROs, I surveyed UCIMC Infection
Prevention regarding the history of their MDRO precaution policies, which were implemented
through automated orders following positive microbiology cultures during the study period,
2010-2013 (194). This allowed me to determine whether and when a patient was placed on
contact precautions during the index admission, the admission in which they were found to
carry CRE, and to calculate the time in days between the admission and the application of
precautions. Time to contact precautions during the index admission was used to quantify
the number of days of CRE exposure to hospitals which would result from the discontinuation
of contact precautions policies for endemic MDROs. Mean time to contact precautions was
compared between CRE carriers who were co-colonized with other MDROs and those who
were not co-colonized using a t-test.
3.3.5 Results
MDRO Co-colonization among CRE Carriers
Of the 61 CRE carrier patients with unique identifiers in the hospitalization database, 29
(48%) were co-colonized with at least one other MDRO. Of these, 13 had MRSA (21%), 14
had VRE (23%), 15 had ESBL (25%), 5 had other MDR GNR (8%), and 2 had C. difficile
(3%). Of the 29 patients colonized with other MDROs in addition to CRE, 14 had more
than one additional MDRO.
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Comparing MDRO Carriage among CRE Carriers and Controls
When using only MRSA as reported in the hospital admissions database administrative
data, 12 of the 61 (20%) CRE cases were co-colonized with MRSA as compared to 28 of
183 comorbidity-matched controls (15%). The difference in percent co-colonized with MRSA
was not significant (p = 0.43).
Impact of CRE Precautions Policies in Limiting CRE Exposure
The total number of inpatient days of CRE exposure during CRE carriers index admissions
which could have been prevented by the implementation of a CRE contact precautions
policy was 803 (out of 1,748 possible days of CRE exposure, or 46%). The number of days
of CRE exposure to healthcare facilities that could have been prevented by CRE contact
precautions policies in addition to policies for other MDROs was not significantly greater
than the number of exposure days which were prevented by policies for other MDROs only
(p = 0.17). There was an average lag time of 4.9 days (SD = 2.2) between CRE culture
collection and microbiology report finalization.
Additional Benefit of Endemic MDRO Precautions Policies on Time to Precau-
tions and CRE Exposure
In 14 of the 29 co-colonized patients, the patient was identified as a carrier of another
MDRO prior to their identification as a CRE carrier. The mean time to contact precautions
for patients co-colonized with CRE and at least one other MDRO was 6.6 days, while the
mean time to contact precautions for CRE carriers without other MDROs was 15.8 days.
The time to precautions for co-colonized patients was significantly shorter than that of CRE
carriers without other MDROs (p = 0.01). Presuming CRE carriers were positive for CRE
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from the first day of their index admission, the number of days of CRE exposure to UCIMC
during the index admission which were prevented by contact precautions policies for the
other, endemic MDROs was 539 out of a total of 1,748 possible days of CRE exposure
(31%). Of these days, 290 would have been prevented by contact precautions policies for
CRE while 249 (14% of the 1,748 total exposure days) could only have been prevented by
contact precautions policies for endemic MDROs.
3.3.6 Discussion
In this aim, I examined how institutional use of contact precautions policies for other MDROs
may be advantageous in isolating patients who are eventually found to harbor CRE and con-
taining the spread of this dangerous pathogen within healthcare facilities. The first step in
examining this interaction between institutional level policies and the intrapersonal factor of
co-colonization was to examine rates of co-colonization among CRE carriers. Given my find-
ing in Aims 1 and 2 that CRE carriers possess common risk factors, such as high comorbidity
and exposure to healthcare facilities, which are similar for many MDROs, I expected to find
a high rate of co-colonization. However, the 48% rate of MDRO co-colonization among CRE
carriers found in this study was deeply concerning given the minimal treatment options for
both CRE and other MDROs.
Further examination of co-colonization with MRSA showed that both the CRE cases and
their comorbidity matched controls had at least double the rate of colonization with MRSA
reported in the general inpatient population, which was found to be 6.6% in 2010 (21).While
the rate of MRSA co-colonization was higher among CRE carriers than among their comorbidity-
matched controls, this difference was not statistically significant, which may either mean that
high comorbidity, rather than any factors more specific to CRE carriers, explains much of
co-colonization or simply that the sample size was too small to detect a significant difference.
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In addition to being extremely high, MDRO colonization among CRE carriers had an unusual
distribution compared to what in typically seen in the general hospital inpatient population.
The proportions of CRE carriers with ESBL and VRE, which are gut bacteria like CRE,
were slightly higher than the proportion with MRSA, which is typically found on the skin
and in the nose. In the general inpatient population, MRSA is far more common than VRE
and ESBL. For example, one study of MDRO incidence at hospitals in the same county as
the study hospital found that mean MRSA incidence was twice that of VRE and more than
ten times that of ESBL (195). These data show that CRE carriers are at an unusually high
risk of co-colonization with VRE and ESBL gut bacteria, likely due to common routes of
acquisition, while also at an elevated risk for MDROs such as MRSA that spread via very
different routes. While these results are troubling for CRE carriers themselves, the bacterial
shedding from carriers represents a major safety risk in healthcare facilities, where they can
be passed to other patients.
The large overlap of CRE carriage with carriage of endemic MDROs found in this study
demonstrated that contact precaution policies for endemic MDROs could have a large impact
in prevention of emerging MDROs such as CRE, and this finding was supported by the
impact of co-colonization on time to contact precautions and CRE exposure days. This
analysis showed that the use of precautions for other MDROs results in an average ten
fewer days per patient from admission to contact precautions for CRE carriers who are co-
colonized compared with those who are not. Furthermore, by use of contact precautions for
endemic MDROs and, therefore, on co-colonized CRE carriers even prior to microbiology
results indicating their CRE status, the healthcare facility studied here decreased the time
during which other patients might have inadvertently been exposed to CRE by 14%. These
data used the broader 2015 CDC CRE surveillance definition. Given that the study period
was 2010-2013, the 2012 CRE definition and earlier, even more stringent hospital definitions
were used, so the decrease in healthcare facility exposure to CRE from endemic MDRO
precautions policies would have been even greater.
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These findings indicate that, currently, the spread of CRE is likely slowed by hospital con-
tact precautions policies for other established MDROs, such as methicillin-resistant Staphy-
lococcus aureus, which has a prevalence of nearly 7% in hospitals (196). Despite potential
CRE prevention benefits, many facilities have begun to discontinue precautions for endemic
MDROs, such as MRSA (192; 193). Contact precaution policies for endemic MDROs are
currently threatened due to the perceived high costs and few short term benefits of using
precautions for MDROs with high prevalence (193; 197; 198). However, this policy change
would eliminate precautions for CRE prior to a CRE positive culture report in these co-
colonized patients, which would result in large exposures of other patients to CRE due to
the disproportionate healthcare facility exposure of CRE carriers.
The use of social ecological models can help reveal potential unintended consequences of
health-related policy changes (199; 200), such as the impact of discontinuation of contact
precautions policies for endemic MDROs on the control of emerging MDROs, including CRE.
Consideration and minimization of such unpredicted side effects and their impact on those
impacted by a program or policy, in this case, patients and their communities, is necessary
and helps to ensure that the policy is socially valid (201). The need to examine and anticipate
unintended higher order effects of changes in small systems has been deemed a central lesson
of ecology in health promotion and public health (202). Consideration of inadvertent effects
on the spread of infectious disease has proven important in a wide range of programs. In
syringe exchange programs inadvertent impacts may have resulted in injection drug users
accessing the programs having higher rates of HIV than those who did not use the program
(203). In development programs, new construction has had side effects in the social ecology
of disease, such as the construction of dams in Ghana and elsewhere which lead to increased
rates of schistosomiasis, a parasitic infection (204). In considering the infectious impact of
discontinuing contact precautions for endemic MDROs, this study drew from the emphases
within social ecology theory on both examination of multiple levels of influence over health
in intervention design and prospective consideration of social validity.
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The study described in this chapter showed that hospital infection prevention policies in-
tended to prevent the spread of endemic MDROs also act to contain other, emerging MDROs
for which no policy yet exists. By identifying the 48% rate of co-colonization of patients with
CRE and endemic MDROs, this study demonstrated how efforts to prevent endemic MDROs
also work to prevent the spread of emerging MDROs. By quantifying the 249 additional pa-
tient days of potential CRE exposures from 61 CRE carriers, this study clarified the true
costs of discontinuation of contact precautions for endemic MDROs, altering the cost/benefit
analysis for precautions, and provides justification for reinstituting discontinued precautions
policies.
This study was limited in that it only evaluated the potential impacts of contact precautions,
not the methods by which contact precautions may be enhanced. Future studies could
build upon this work by also examining communication and screening policies as adjuncts
to contact precautions. Still, given that contact precautions are the most common policy
hospitals are willing to adopt to contain CRE spread, this study presents important evidence
to support policy implementation.
The results of this study demonstrate the inter-dependence of infection prevention policies
targeting different pathogens and the need to consider the interactions of these institutional
level policies with patient intrapersonal factors, such as co-colonization, in infection preven-
tion. For example, because contact precautions policies for endemic MDROs could have
prevented 14% of healthcare facility exposure to CRE during the CRE carriers index ad-
missions, CDCs CRE toolkit recommendations might consider urging hospitals to not only
isolate those who are identified as CRE carriers, but to also continue to use contact pre-
cautions for the endemic MDROs which are often co-carried with CRE. Future infection
prevention policies must work towards a more ecological, less disease-specific approach that
considers the potential implications of policy changes on all MDROs, rather than simply
those the policy was originally intended to combat.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
The infectious spread of emerging MDROs such as CRE places high morbidity and mortality
burdens on patients within the healthcare system. In this study, one-third of CRE carriers
died within a year of their first positive microbiology study. Given the high mortality rate,
lack of antibiotic treatment options, and rapid spread within California, CRE represents a
key target for infection prevention containment efforts. Transmission of pathogens between
people drives the emergent spread of CRE. Recognizing the importance of this social ecolog-
ical component in the spread of CRE, the studies described here showed how factors at three
levels - the patient, the hospital, and the nursing home - interact through inter-facility patient
sharing to influence individual patient carriage of CRE and future visits to healthcare facil-
ities that could further spread this dangerous pathogen. After identifying how these factors
interact, I then considered the effects of two different surveillance definitions. Surveillance
definitions are critical for identifying and then containing CRE. Finally, I used the social
ecological principle of multiple levels of influence to examine how the interaction of factors at
the institutional and intrapersonal levels impacts the social validity and unintended effects
of contact precautions policies used to control MDROs.
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These studies began necessary CRE surveillance in a region in which CRE is still emerging
to understand the current extent of CRE spread and identify targets for intervention. The
results demonstrate that CRE is spreading rapidly across California, exposing healthcare
facilities, and patients within them, as CRE carriers move via inter-facility patient sharing.
However, the order of magnitude difference in CRE prevalence between the Northern and
Southern California regions (21 northern cases vs. 217 southern per 100,000 patients) found
in this study confirms that CRE is still emerging in California, with the bulk of spread
occurring in Southern California. Containment efforts should focus on Southern California
to help prevent the spread of CRE throughout the state.
The results of these studies confirm the importance of CRE containment by demonstrating
its high mortality, which was 35
Definitions of sickness and disease are culturally specific and control social response to illness.
Changes in CRE surveillance definitions directly impact the ability of healthcare facilities to
identify CRE carriers and prevent the spread of CRE using infection control practices such
as contact precautions policies. The results of this study showed that the use of the more
restrictive 2012 CDC surveillance definition for CRE resulted in decreased identification of
CRE carriers as compared to the 2015 definition. The undetected carriers had a high rate
of healthcare facility exposure following identification of their CRE carrier status. These
unrealized opportunities for CRE carrier identification may have caused even greater, un-
controlled spread of strains missed by the 2012 definition. Because these missed strains were
already circulating abroad in 2012, at the time of the original CDC CRE definition, this
study demonstrates the importance of taking a global perspective and acknowledging the
tight epidemiological links which exist across geopolitical boundaries when defining MDROs
in the United States. In addition to earlier application of targeted infection control policies,
a more proactive approach to MDRO control includes broader thinking in the creation of
surveillance definitions, including consideration of world-wide epidemiological trends.
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Because CRE is currently rare, proactive approaches to controlling emerging MDROs are
uncommon, and funding for such measures is extremely limited, active surveillance for CRE
via screening is not typically performed, despite CDC recommendations. However, patients
are routinely screened for endemic MDROs. For example, in California, hospitals are required
by law to screen patients for MRSA, the most common MDRO. Endemic MDROs share many
risk factors with emerging MDROs, and co-colonization is common. Given that nearly half
of the CRE carriers in this study were found to be co-colonized with endemic MDROs,
institutional contact precautions policies for endemic MDROs can be leveraged to decrease
time to contact precautions for CRE carriers in healthcare facilities. Contact precautions
policies for endemic MDROs can improve institutional level safety for all patients by isolating
patients who are eventually found to harbor CRE an average of ten days before their CRE
carrier status is known.
More generally, this study showed that hospital infection prevention policies intended to pre-
vent the spread of endemic MDROs also act to contain other, emerging MDROs for which
no policy yet exists. As healthcare facilities consider policy changes, such as discontinuing
contact precautions policies for endemic MDROs, it is important to consider how multi-
ple levels of influence control health outcomes at the patient level in order to prospectively
avoid undesirable policy impacts. Such considerations illuminate the true costs of discontin-
uation of contact precautions for endemic MDROs by highlighting their effects on emerging
MDROs. By quantifying these effects, this study provides justification for reinstituting dis-
continued precautions policies. Future infection prevention policies must work towards a
more ecological, less disease-specific approach that recognizes the inter-dependence of in-
fection prevention policies and considers the potential implications of policy changes on all
MDROs, endemic and emerging.
As the population in the United States ages, it becomes increasingly important to understand
how factors at multiple levels of influence, including institutional infection prevention policies
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and patient level comorbidity, contribute to the population burden of infectious disease.
CRE can serve as one indicator to help understand the threat posed by MDROs to public
health in an aging population and to provide a social ecological model of emerging MDRO
epidemiology to assess regional strategies for controlling pathogen spread. The high mortality
and risk of CRE exposure across healthcare facilities due to inter-facility patient sharing
measured in this study should motivate collaborative, proactive work among healthcare
facilities in regional networks to limit the spread of CRE. Through use of an ecological model
of emerging MDRO epidemiology, proactive interventions, such as contact precautions, can
be targeted to reduce the burden of emerging MDROs.
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